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Каспинфо август 2002 |
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Название: Социальные проблемы в странах Прикаспия на англ. языке Главные Пункты: * На встрече с ВР, которая проводилась в рамках проведения ОВОСС проекта БТД, представитель администрации грузинской деревни заявил, что население не позволит прокладывать трубопровод, если деревня ничего не получит взамен. На вопросы о компенсациях местным жителям представитель ВР ответил, что с собственниками этих земель будут подписаны договоры о возмещении. На данный момент ни Правительство Грузии, ни ВР не представили на суд общественности планируемые гарантии безопасности трубопровода. * Помимо того, что ОВОСС проекта БТД не предлагает решения проблем, связанных с компенсациями за землю, поставками электроэнергии, безопасностью трубопровода и безработицей, он не предполагает участия местного населения в подготовке ОВОСС (12.08.2002) Полный Текст Социальные проблемы в странах Прикаспия на англ. языке Социальные проблемы в странах Прикаспия на англ. языке *** GEORGIAN VILLAGERS HAGGLE WITH OIL GIANT As the start date for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline nears, villagers along the route are asking what they will get out of it Giorgy Kupatadze in Nazarlo Around 100 people, mostly men, gathered early one morning last month in the sports hall of the local school in the village of Nazarlo near the border with Azerbaijan. They heard out the representatives from the oil company BP in almost total silence then noisily vented their complaints and concerns. The meeting was one of many taking place during a two-week social and environmental assessment project carried out by the petroleum giant in the Gardabani region, south of Tbilisi. The consultation process is one of the preconditions for work to begin on two ambitious international pipelines linking the Caspian and Black Seas. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which will cost more than two billion dollars to build, is intended as the main export route for Caspian Sea oil to western markets. Construction is due to begin early next year and the first oil will flow through it at the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005. A gas pipeline from Baku to the Turkish city of Erzerum, running parallel to the oil carrier, should be completed in 2005. As the construction start-date nears, BP, the biggest investor in the project, has been canvassing the views of people living close to the pipelines in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. It is not an easy process and the company is finding that the villagers are canny negotiators. The Georgian government has acclaimed the Baku-Ceyhan project as the "project of the century" which will strengthen the country's independence and help its integration into the West. But many ordinary Georgians, giving their views to BP and in opinion polls, are cynical, expressing the view that the main aim of the project is to raise the political stock of the Tbilisi authorities both at home and abroad. Zurab Shurga, the official in charge of monitoring the project with the Georgian International Oil Corporation, GIOC, begs to differ. "Of course there is a serious political factor in the projects, but the economic component is still the main one," he said. Shurgaya pointed out that every year up to 50 million tons of crude oil (equivalent to one million barrels a day) and 7.3 billion cubic metres of gas will be shipped down the pipelines, giving Georgia substantial new revenues. However, the main topic in the dialogue between BP and the inhabitants of some of the 72 villages on the route was their own social problems. "For ten years the government has had no time for us, they remember us only when they themselves find it essential," said one villager Merab Jangirashvili. "Maybe these projects are important for the country, but if we don't receive anything from the companies who are building these pipelines, then we can't expect anything from the government." Valery Avaliani, a local official from the village of Lemshveniera went further. At a meeting with the BP representatives, he said that his villagers would not allow construction to go ahead, if they did not receive anything in return. "Until BP - or whoever it is - repairs the kindergarten or puts in a pumping plant or fixes the roads, we won't let them do anything, " he said. Rusudan Medzmariashvili of the oil company's public affairs office responded to this by saying that it was already beginning to work on social projects and so the villagers' problems would be solved. The villagers have a long list of points they are haggling over. For instance, they are interested in getting a share of the energy passing down the pipelines. They were told, however, that the oil is for export only, while some gas could be diverted to them. They also take a keen interest in what compensation they will receive for land taken up by the pipelines and how many construction jobs they will create in a region of high unemployment. "Most locals, including people with higher education, don't have jobs," complained one man named Ashot Azimov. "Young people go to Tbilisi, graduate from institutes and then sit at home without any work." BP official Libby Hirshon said 2,500 people would be employed in constructing the pipeline. Some of them would be overseas professionals, but most would be Georgians, with many coming from villages near the pipelines. Zurab Shurga of GIOC said that a number of firms had started compiling lists of locals wishing to take part in the construction work but that the last word lay with the contractor, BP. As for compensation for land use, the oil giant said that any owners of the 44-metre-wide corridor through which the pipelines will pass are to be given reimbursement contracts to sign. But that is not yet enough for some locals. "Who will be responsible if an accident happens, who will compensate us for the damage?" asked Naira Jangirashvili, an official in the village of Lelaashkha. "They may simply forget about the local residents if that happens." The villagers are therefore asking for the land compensation document to contain a clause about compensation in case of an accident. Neither the Georgian government nor BP have yet outlined publicly how they plan to guarantee the safety of this important project, although a military training exercise is currently simulating how to protect the pipeline and the territory around it and to supply humanitarian aid to the population. It is the third such operation along the pipeline route. "If there are unforeseen situations in Georgia, there will be at least 60 officers, capable of acting in these circumstances," said Irakli Batkuashvili, who runs NATO's Partnership for Peace programme for the Georgian general staff. BP will finish drafting its final social and environmental assessment this month and give it to the Georgian government at the end of August. It will then be handed to villagers along the pipeline route. Giorgy Kupatadze is a correspondent with Black Sea Press in Tbilisi IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, No. 140, August 1st, 2002. Copyright (c) 2002 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE No. 140 *** *** FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 9, 2002 Incomplete Assessments - Who Will Guarantee Pipeline Safety? More Question on British Petroleum's Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Tbilisi, July 9, 2002 - Two documents published today by the CEE Bankwatch Network criticise plans for a proposed oil export pipeline in Georgia. The papers - "Quality Analysis of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Draft Report for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline: Georgian Part" and "Comments on Draft ESIA Report for BTC pipeline (Georgia)" - find many deficiencies in a report on the Georgian section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This report, the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), was released earlier this spring. While at first glance the ESIA contains all relevant information, we have identified major shortcomings that could affect not only the livelihood of affected communities and the fragile environment of Georgia, but also create problems in other areas of the country's economic development. One shortcoming of the ESIA is that it lacks baseline socio-economic and environmental data, making any proper analysis of its findings difficult. Furthermore, mitigation measures to offset damage caused by construction and operation of the pipeline rely on an as-of-yet unwritten Environmental and Social Management Plan. Meanwhile the analysis of the project's impacts and the magnitude of these impacts are not based on sound scientific methods, leading to a significant underestimation of the impacts' significance and a lack of adequate responses. Few alternatives are discussed, and the ESIA merely compares the "no- development" and "development" option, defending the latter with "potential positive effects", including supposed financial, social and environmental benefits. In truth, the BTC pipeline will only increase the country's ability to export oil more efficiently and not even partially addresses the real problems of the affected communities: access to energy, unemployment and poor infrastructure, particularly roads. The only other potential positive effect specified by the company is "increased employment opportunities", even though the report admits that these benefits consist of "a limited number of direct employment opportunities on the project, primarily short term jobs during construction, with fewer, longer term opportunities during operation". Such predictions clearly contradict the 'sustainable development' that the project is supposed to offer the affected communities. The ESIA lacks any consideration of alternative pipeline routing that might be environmentally preferable. While the Eastern Corridor was rejected "owing to the length, the severe rugged terrain and environmental constraints associated with the Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park", the ESIA accepted the "Modified Central Corridor", which in fact crosses the buffer zone of the very same Borjomi- Kharagauli National Park plus the Ktsia-Tabatskuri managed reserve and such sensitive areas as the Borjomi Mineral Water Aquifer and the Tsalka underground water reserves. Overall, the report uses whatever environmental data is convenient to justify final choices which were in fact based on technical and economic reasons. The report tries to present the project in such a way that there are no risks and cumulative impacts, while ignoring the possibility of a major accident with national or regional consequences. In addition, the draft ESIA fails to assess potential economic impacts on the mineral water industry in Borjomi. Since the quality of mineral springs within and outside of the Borjomi-Kharagauli Natural Park might be affected by the project, potential impacts should be assessed and mitigation measures along with a plan for compensation developed - something which the report fails to do. Other issues the ESIA fails to address are problems of land compensation, energy supply, safety, infrastructure development and employment. Furthermore, there is no indication that the project sponsor plans to improve the public participation process in order to increase affected communities' understanding of the project's impacts and benefits. During almost every public hearing people expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the lack of information on the above mentioned issues. CEE Bankwatch Network's reports can be found at www.bankwatch.org Quality Assessment: www.bankwatch.org/downloads/btc-esia- analysis.pdf Comments: www.bankwatch.org/downloads/btc-esia-comments.pdf For more information: Manana Kochladze Green Alternative/CEE Bankwatch Network tel: (+99) 532 22 33 47 manana@wanex.net |