Каспинфо ноябрь 2001 |
Название: Нефтяные проекты на Каспии на англ. языке Главные Пункты: * Несмотря на события в Афганистане и Грузии, западные нефтяные компании не собираются покидать Каспий. Однако все большее внимание уделяется России, активно участвующей в нефтяных проектах на Каспии, в т.ч. в проекте Баку-Джейхан посредством ЛУКОйла. (05.11.2001) Полный Текст Нефтяные проекты на Каспии на англ. языке Нефтяные проекты на Каспии на англ. языке *** BUSINESS & ECONOMICS October 31, 2001 RUSSIA RAISES ITS CASPIAN BASIN ENERGY PROFILE Alec Appelbaum: 10/29/01 Azerbaijan and Georgia pegged their economic hopes to the idea that Western firms would create jobs and revenues in order to export oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. There is now reason to doubt that particular development model. Tumult in Central Asia has made Western companies anxious to find fossil-fuel supplies outside the Middle East. At the same time, Georgian unrest makes the Caucasus a more costly alternative. This twin source of instability gives Russia an economic advantage in the competition to develop Caspian Basin energy resources. Since Washington embraced Moscow as a geopolitical ally in the ongoing anti-terrorism campaign, Russia has become a more alluring source of energy for the West. And as Russia's image improves, Georgia grapples with the potential resumption of the Abkhazia war and related civil unrest. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. These two developments will probably not disturb Caspian energy activity that has already started. But experts say these events will encourage multinational oil companies to reconsider their export strategies, perhaps seeking other routes through Russia - or looking elsewhere in the world for future exploration. Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, Western companies were giving Russia a second look as a reliable source of energy. Russian oilfields, which never reached their potential under Soviet management, are now showing promise, according to energy consultant Peter Fusaro of Global Change Associates. Russian energy researcher Eugene Khartukov told an American trade publication in March that the country might produce as much as 400 million tons of oil this year, which would be a 23 percent climb over last year's output. As Russian companies pursue new refining and delivery facilities in the Gulf of Finland and elsewhere in the north, some experts expect the country to pump out 5 million barrels of oil a day by 2005. That would be a little more than 20 percent of what OPEC nations currently produce. More purchases of Russian oil would probably come at the Caspian's expense, even though several prominent Western companies have already made large investments in the region. Available pipeline options may heavily influence decision-making. The Russian-backed Caspian Pipeline Consortium began operating on October 15. Meanwhile, a competing pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, via Georgia, known as Baku-Ceyhan, may not get started on time, despite the explicit support of the United States. Russian leaders are eager to transmit through the relatively tranquil Baltic Sea, says Fusaro, and have never been enthusiastic about Baku-Ceyhan, which would bypass Russia altogether. Some experts doubt the project can be completed by the scheduled date of 2004. "I've never believed B-T-C [Baku-Ceyhan] was politically or commercially feasible," says Julia Nanay, a director at the Petroleum Finance Company consultancy. Unrest in Georgia would make the challenges to building and operating the pipeline even greater. Russia's ascendancy hides behind some visible work in the Caucasus. British Petroleum (BP) - the British energy giant that leads the consortium building Baku-Ceyhan - insists that trouble in Georgia won't disrupt the pipeline, or other Caspian projects. "This is a 40-year project, and one has to think of things in those terms," says Toby Odone, a BP spokesman in London. "In the last eight years an awful lot of things have happened, including fighting in Georgia, but the pipeline is moving ahead." Indeed, all multinationals insist they will remain committed to developing Caspian Basin energy resources and export routes. ChevronTexaco, which has invested heavily in Kazakhstan's Tengiz oilfield, says its strategy is intact. "Our plans haven't changed," says spokesman Fred Gorell in San Francisco. ExxonMobil spokesman Bob Davis, in Houston, also says the company's Caspian presence will carry on for at least the next two years, adding that ExxonMobil plans to expand thereafter in the former Soviet Union. On October 29, ExxonMobil announced that it would start in 2002 a 12-year exploration project in Russia's far eastern Sakhalin Island region, costing up to $40 billion. The reaffirmation of oil companies to Caspian projects does not contradict the idea that Russia will gain economic advantage at the Caucasus' expense. It's good strategy for these companies to search for alternate sources of energy, far from the Middle East. Such a signal keeps investors and consumers confident. But Caspian activity has never really been a replacement for Persian Gulf routes, says Fusaro. He says more than half of Americans' oil already comes from the Western Hemisphere. Firms like BP invest in equipment and exploration all over the world, so that they never place too much money at risk in one country. So while the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline currently offers its investors a good foothold and excellent public relations, it need not herald long-term growth for Caucasian economies. Fusaro says the Caspian cannot neatly substitute for the Middle East, because oil companies have so many politically preferable options. "You don't have the threat of Islamic uprising in Latin America at all," he says. "Brazil has the most successful offshore production in the world; Argentina is exporting oil now." Since multinationals have almost no shortage of choices about where to commit dollars in the future, anything that makes the Caspian Basin appear costlier, including the danger that guerilla warfare in Georgia could result in the destruction of a pipeline, makes that particular source less attractive to energy conglomerates, relative to other sources. An increasingly attractive alternate source may well be a strong Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has played America's crisis brilliantly, says Carol Saivetz of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies. Putin is likely to gain long-term strategic and political support as a reward. In this context, Saivetz considers it noteworthy that Lukoil, the former state-sponsored Russian energy company, recently announced that it would consider investing in Baku-Ceyhan. "Putin has decided this is an economic issue and a geopolitical issue," she says. "If [the pipeline] is going to go ahead, he probably wants to let Lukoil be involved." Lukoil is already extending its reach into the United States - it bought the gas stations of Getty Oil in late 2000. It now looks ready to become a player wherever Western investment may flow. Putin may try trading his support of Baku-Ceyhan, which the Bush administration badly wants, for American concessions in other political or economic areas. Of course, Russia could still squander the reserve of goodwill that now exists in the West. Fusaro says any whiff of Russian imperialism in Georgia would "be terrible," belying Putin's promise of democratic reform, and would alienate Western firms. Nanay is monitoring Russian actions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, looking for signs that Russian officials are trying to exploit current conditions to advance their own geopolitical and economic interests. If Russia makes too many demands concerning Georgia, energy firms will probably go elsewhere. It is even possible that Iran might eventually engage in political horse-trading with the West, offering some form of support in exchange for pipeline investments. In large measure, the Caspian region remains dependent on Russian investment and cooperation for its economic future. Given Putin's canny strategic moves so far, combined with the fact that Russian energy capacity continues to show profit potential, it seems unlikely that Moscow will not make abrupt energy-policy changes. Editor's Note: Alec Appelbaum is a contributing editor to EurasiaNet. Email this article Posted October 29, 2001 L Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org |