|
Каспинфо ноябрь 2001 |
|
Название: Нефтегазовые проекты на Каспии на англ. языке Главные Пункты: * С.Манн, советник по энергетической политике США на Каспии, утверждает, что США не намерены изменять свою энергетическую политику в регионе в связи с антитеррористической операцией. Он также заявил, что США не имеют планов по сооружению трубопроводов для транспортировки каспийских энергоресурсов, предполагающих сотрудничество с Ираном. * Азербайджан, активно сотрудничающий с США в вопросах энергоресурсов Каспия, надеется на участие России в проекте Баку-Джейхан, т.к. Россия владеет мощными экономическими и политическими рычагами, способными помешать развитию Азербайджана. (22.11.2001) Полный Текст Нефтегазовые проекты на Каспии на англ. языке Нефтегазовые проекты на Каспии на англ. языке *** AMERICAN DIPLOMAT SEES ENCOURAGING SIGNS ON BAKU-CEYHAN PIPELINE Q & A with Steven R. Mann: 11/08/01 Azerbaijan and Georgia, fledgling republics on the Caspian Sea, both lack free elections or diverse economies. What they both have is oil. For three years, Azerbaijan has lured Western energy firms to commit to shares in a pipeline from its seacoast capital, Baku, through the Georgian capital of Tbilisi into the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The pipeline would bypass Russia altogether, thus presumably concentrating jobs, revenue and influence in its home countries. This has won it the backing of the United States, which was eager to offset Russian energy dominance before Russia embraced the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks on American soil. The pipeline, which proponents have promised will be operational by 2002, has aroused skeptical responses from Western energy experts. It has also taken on a weightier symbolic burden: at a conference dedicating the three countries to the pipeline in 1998, Turkey's then-president Suleiman Denirel declared it "the most brilliant peace project of the 21st century." Peace has been elusive since then, but Steven R. Mann remains upbeat about the prospects for pipeline-driven economic development in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Mann was the American ambassador to Turkmenistan from 1998 until this May. Since then, he has served as the US State Department's Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. He spoke with EurasiaNet about Baku-Ceyhan and the murky prospects of Azerbaijani transactions with Turkmenistan. EurasiaNet: What effects will the events around Afghanistan have on US Caspian energy policy? Mann: It would be a mistake to look for dramatic changes in US actions and policy on Caspian energy affairs as a result of events further south. There's a fundamental logic to US policy, and this policy has been affirmed by two successive US administrations. Also, the projects involved are multibillion-dollar projects with very long lead times. That is another reason why [one should] not expect any sharp change. EurasiaNet: Could you explain, then, a quotation I saw that rather struck me? The Teheran-based Caspian News Agency says it was taken from your speech to the US-Russian Business Council three or four weeks ago. It seemed, at least according to this quotation, that you hinted that the United States could now support a route through Iran for Turkmenistan's gas to Turkey. Mann: It would be an understatement to say that that account has nothing at all in common with my actual remarks. I have a copy of that speech, I know it well, and I cannot recognize anything I said that could even be interpreted that way. It is possible that during the question-and-answer period I may have alluded to projects that the Turkmen government might consider. But I can't see how any US official would offer warm words for pipeline projects through Iran. EurasiaNet: What about a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline, which Unocal was interested in during the mid-1990s? That idea has been resurfacing lately in various commentaries and analyses. Mann: [Turkmen] President Saparmyat Niyazov raised this with me when I was in Ashgabat a few weeks ago. I repeated to him what I had been saying for years when I was ambassador to Turkmenistan. The most serious problems for a pipeline taking Turkmenistan's gas through Pakistan - to anywhere - have nothing to do with Afghanistan. They concern, rather, the financial situation in Pakistan, the continued heavy regulation of natural gas prices in Pakistan, and the fact that prospects for Pakistani exports to India are less than sure. All these elements make the downstream from Turkmenistan very difficult, and none of them has anything to do with Afghanistan - which is a separate, large problem. EurasiaNet: What is your view of the growing body of opinion that there may be significant amounts of gas under the ground in Pakistan itself? Mann: Yes, that is another complication. I have mentioned this fact in my discussions with the Turkmen government over the years, that Pakistan is exploring its natural gas resources. Indeed, this fact points out a fundamental wisdom about Caspian energy. Early pipelines count. When you have a chance to build a pipeline, you should do it, because new energy resources are coming on line all the time. EurasiaNet: It is generally agreed that the Turkmen government's negotiating strategy over the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project was suboptimal. But in the Caspian region, the United States is sometimes blamed for the project's failure to get off the ground. How did the exploration of Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz field affect the TCGP negotiations? Did the United States. revise its recommendations about allocating volumes between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for the TCGP throughput, and were those revised recommendations unacceptable to [Turkmen officials in] Ashgabat? Mann: The US never took sides between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and never made proposals about volumes. We pointed out many times, in our discussions with the Turkmen government, that they would have to engage Azerbaijan directly on TCGP issues. As development of the Shah-Deniz deposit proceeded, it became clear that this was one of several issues that would have to be addressed. But the government of Turkmenistan never contacted the government of Azerbaijan on this subject. Presidents Niyazov and Aliev had some telephone conversations about it, but there was never any serious, sustained contact with Azerbaijan on the part of the Turkmenistan government. In fact, at that point two countries did not have embassies in each other's capital. EurasiaNet: As I recall, after March 2000, the project was left in companies' laps. I believe President Niyazov said the offer was insufficient and that he would be waiting to be contacted after it was revised. Is that right? Mann: I remember the March 2000 meeting extremely well. At that point the US and Turkey made a joint mission to Turkmenistan for one final attempt to save the TCGP. Ambassador John Wolf came out with Turkish Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Mithat Balkan, and the three of us met with President Niyazov for two hours. Among the many things we said, was that the financial deal on offer by PSG and Shell (which by then had joined the TCGP consortium) was the best offer that the consortium could make. We emphasized that there could be no better offer, and we urged him in the strongest terms to take it. However, he wanted a greater financial return on the package, and moreover, an immediate financial return. EurasiaNet: You're referring there to the infamous "pre-financing"? Mann: Yes. In simple terms, if you are building a $2 billion pipeline, you cannot saddle it with $300-500 million additional debt right up front. EurasiaNet: To switch gears, I heard several weeks ago that industry teams are going out to Baku to prepare for the actual work on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Has the decision been taken to proceed with BTC, even though the second phase of the engineering study is not yet completed? Mann: BTC is looking very good. They have put out the initial tender documents, they are about to freeze project design, and they have started the financing phase by contacting major lenders. EurasiaNet: What about the Kazakh-Azerbaijani negotiations to define the framework of the intergovernmental arrangements, the rules of game, to make it possible for Kazakh oil to enter BTC from across the Caspian later in the decade? Mann: Progress there also looks very good. There is a draft intergovernmental agreement on table, Azerbaijan has reviewed it and given good comments on it, and I need to touch base with Kazakhstan about it in the next month. Also the Turks have already had somewhat detailed discussions with both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan about this. In sum, I'm very optimistic. Editor's Note: This EurasiaNet Q&A was conducted by Dr. Robert M. Cutler, Research Fellow at the Institute of European & Russian Studies at Carleton University in Montreal, Canada. Email this article Posted November 8, 2001 L Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org/index.shtml *** BUSINESS & ECONOMICS AZERBAIJAN ENGAGED IN BALANCING ACT THAT COULD INFLUENCE OIL & GAS DEVELOPMENT Kenan Aliyev: 11/06/01 In the Caucasus' new geopolitical environment, Azerbaijan is hoping to take advantage of new opportunities for cooperation with the United States. At the same time, Azerbaijani leaders are wary that Russia may be intent on reasserting its influence in the Caucasus while the United States is preoccupied with its anti-terrorism campaign. As a result, Baku is engaged in a delicate diplomatic balancing act, which could have profound ramifications for the development of Caspian Basin natural resources. Azerbaijan has been an enthusiastic backer of the US-led anti-terrorism campaign, sharing intelligence and granting fly-over rights. US lawmakers have reciprocated by bolstering support for President Heidar Aliyev's government, in particular voting to lift trade sanctions imposed during the height of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1992. The lifting of sanctions, which is dependent on White House approval, would facilitate aid and trade, as well as potentially boost Azerbaijani efforts to develop its oil and gas sector. While Azerbaijani leaders seem anxious to align themselves with the West in the hopes of reaping enormous oil and gas profits, they are taking care to placate Russian security concerns, seeking to reassure Moscow that Baku's strategic cooperation with Washington is not a zero-sum gambit. Aliyev and other officials know Russia retains powerful economic and political weapons that, if deployed, could hinder - even upend - Azerbaijan's development plans. For example, Russia could impose visa requirements for Azerbaijanis. An estimated 1 million Azerbaijanis live and work in Russia, and the imposition of visa requirements on them would have profound economic implications for Azerbaijan. Baku's tactics seem dedicated to addressing Moscow's immediate strategic interests. Moscow in recent weeks has stepped up efforts to resolve its Chechnya conundrum, and to this end Baku has appeared more responsive to Russian demands concerning Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan. During a late October visit to Azerbaijan, Russian Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov called on the Azerbaijani government not to accept Chechen refugees, and to repatriate those already in Azerbaijan. In pressing his case, Gryzlov asserted that Chechens were terrorists, with close links to Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. Gryzlov added that Chechen terrorists utilized Azerbaijan to engage in drug trafficking, and warned Azerbaijani officials about a risk of terrorist incidents being organized by Chechens residing in Azerbaijan. While there are no official statistics, some experts estimate that there are about 9,000 Chechen refugees, mainly women and children, in Azerbaijan. Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States dramatically altered geopolitical conditions in the Caucasus, Baku had extradited dozens of Chechens to Russia. Local observers say that Baku is now increasingly willing to consider the large-scale repatriation of Chechen refugees. In addition, Azerbaijani authorities are lending preliminary support to a proposal by the pro-Moscow Chechen Authority of Akhmad Kadyrov to open a representative office in Baku, the Ekho newspaper reported October 30. Meanwhile, President Aliyev, accommodating a longstanding Russian demand, has signaled his willingness to lease the Gabala early-warning radar station to Russia. The station was built by Moscow in 1984, and is Russia's only military facility in Azerbaijan. Russia and Azerbaijan had been haggling over a lease extension for several years. Azerbaijani government sources say a deal on the radar station could be signed during Aliyev's next trip to Moscow, which is scheduled for early 2002. Azerbaijan's newfound readiness to accommodate Russia on Chechnya and the Gabala facility is more than just a geopolitical balancing act; it is a direct response to what Baku perceives as a national security threat. Azerbaijani officials are alarmed by the simmering tension between Russia and Georgia, as well as the political turmoil now gripping Tbilisi. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Azerbaijani politicians believe that Russia is responsible for foment the ongoing unrest in Georgia. A big motive for Russia, as Azerbaijani leaders see it, is a desire to retain a controlling influence in the competition to develop Caspian Basin natural resources. Georgia figures prominently in the potential construction of a pipeline, known as Baku-Ceyhan, which would break Russia's stranglehold on Caspian export routes. The pipeline as envisioned would take Caspian resources from Azerbaijan, via Georgia, to Turkey, bypassing Russia altogether. Prior to September 11, Russia had been a steadfast opponent of Baku-Ceyhan. But the Russian stance on construction of the pipeline seems to have softened in recent weeks. The reason may be that Azerbaijan, along with the United States, may now be more willing to share the wealth. Indeed, Baku-Ceyhan's best chance for realization may depend on the participation of Russian companies in the construction consortium. Local observers believe that Russian energy giant Lukoil could become a participant. The company and its president, Vagit Alekperov, enjoy the high esteem of Baku's leadership. Recently, Aliyev awarded Alekperov one of Azerbaijan's highest honors. During recent congressional testimony, Brenda Shaffer, the research director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University, said that incorporating Russian interests into projects such as Baku-Ceyhan increase "the likelihood of these projects' realization." She added: "Actions resulting from US-Russian rivalry can be very destabilizing to the region and, as a result, contrary to US goals." Editor's Note: Kenan Aliev is a journalist based in Washington, DC. Posted November 6, 2001 L Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org/index.shtml *** /14:46 27.11.2001/ ChevronTexaco and its Partners Celebrate the Opening of the Caspian Pipeline Moscow, November 27, 2001. (CNA). At a special ceremony held today at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, Russia, ChevronTexaco Corp. and its partners celebrated the opening of a new oil export route from the Caspian region. The press office of the ChevronTexaco Corp. informs that the 900-mile pipeline, built from the Tengiz Field in western Kazakhstan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, commenced tanker loading last month. ChevronTexaco has a 15 percent interest in the $2.65 billion pipeline, which will be able to carry up to a maximum of 600,000 barrels per day in its initial phase. Among those participating in the ceremony were Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shkolnik of Kazakhstan; First Deputy Minister of Energy Ivan Matlashov of Russia; Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Vicky Bailey, Assistant Secretary of Energy, U.S. government; ChevronTexaco chairman and CEO Dave O-Reilly, and vice chairman Dick Matzke. Senior executives from the other CPC shareholders were also present. ?This achievement comes at a time of increased partnership between the U.S., Russia, and Kazakhstan,¦ said O-Reilly. He added, ?CPC is a bellwether project for successful international cooperation and demonstrates the confidence the international business community has to invest in Russia and Kazakhstan.¦ Dick Matzke said, ?The people of CPC, its partners, shareholders and the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan have every reason to be proud of their joint success.¦ He added, ?This world-class infrastructure project will encourage the development of oil fields in the region.¦ Construction of the pipeline commenced in May 1999. The terminal received first oil in August 2001 and will be able to operate at its capacity of 600,000 barrels per day in the first half of 2002. CPC unlocks the potential of the Caspian region and will allow ChevronTexaco to maximize its investments in the supergiant Tengiz oil field and the gas condensate Karachaganak Field, both in Kazakhstan. ChevronTexaco holds a 50 percent interest in Tengiz and a 20 percent interest in Karachaganak. The participants in CPC and their ownership interests are: Russian Federation (24 percent), the Republic of Kazakhstan (19 percent), Sultanate of Oman (7 percent), Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Co. (15 percent), LUKARCO B.V. (12.5 percent), Rosneft/Shell Caspian Ventures Ltd. (7.5 percent), Mobil Caspian Pipeline Co. (7.5 percent), Agip International (N.A.) NV (2 percent), BG Overseas Holding Limited (2 percent), Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC (1.75 percent), and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC (1.75 percent). CNA/www.caspian.ru *** /14:42 27.11.2001/ Caspian Pipeline Consortium completes new oil export from the Caspian region Novorossiysk, November 27, 2001. (CNA). A ceremony to celebrate the opening of a new oil export route from the Caspian Region was held today at the Marine Terminal of The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in Yuzhnaya Ozereyka near Novorossiysk, CPC press office informs. In attendance were representatives of the CPC’s government-shareholders, including Kazakhstan Deputy Prime-Minister and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Vladimir Shkolnik, RF 1st Deputy Minister of Energy Ivan Matlashov and Sultanate of Oman Minister of National Economy Ahmed Macki. "On behalf of the CPC I would like to thank all those who supported us and helped us during the construction process, including the governments of all of the countries participating in the project, our shareholders and representatives of the regional authorities in the territories through which the pipeline runs," said CPC General Director Sergey Gnatchenko. "For over a month, the pipeline has been operating in a test capacity. Tests of all pipeline systems have been completed successfully thus far. Now we can talk about the opening of our new pipeline system." The ceremony was attended by representatives of company-shareholders of the consortium, including LUKoil President Vagit Alekperov and ChevronTexaco Chairman David O’Reilly. Also in attendance were delegations from the local regions through which the CPC pipeline runs - Kazakhstan’s Atyrauskaya Oblast, RF Astrakhan Oblast, Republic of Kalmykiya, Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais. Representatives of the diplomatic corps and heads of subcontractor companies were also present. The first trial tanker was loaded at the CPC Marine Terminal on October 13-14. The CPC is planning to ship about 1 million tones of oil by the end of this year. Oil is being transported to the CPC Marine Terminal near Novorossiysk from the Tengiz oil field in Western Kazakhstan. "Four more tankers were loaded since the CPC announced the trial tanker loading at it’s new terminal on October 15," said Gnatchenko. "As of this moment, 450,000 tons of oil have been shipped and the sixth tanker is being loaded today. I hope that CPC will become operational at rated capacity early next year." The CPC is one of the major investment projects on the territory of the former USSR with the participation of foreign capital. The cost of the initial phase of the project was $2.6 billion. The length of the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline is 1,510-kilometers. It took 1million tons of oil to fill the system. During the pipeline construction over 160,000 joints were welded and 3,000 kilometers of cable were laid and assembled. At the peak of construction 6,000 people participated in the project. The pipeline’s initial rated capacity is 28.2 million tons per year. Future expansions will increase the pipeline system capacity to 67 million tons per year. The ownership interest of governments-founders of the CPC is as follows: Russia- 24%, Kazakhstan - 19%, Sultanate of Oman - 7%. Private oil companies participating in the consortium are: Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company - 15%, LUKARCO B.V. - 12,5%, Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited - 7,5%, Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company - 7,5%, Agip International (N.A.) N.V. - 2%, BG Overseas Holding Limited - 2%, Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC - 1,75%, and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC, Kerr-McGee group of companies - 1,75%. CNA/www.caspian.ru |