Каспинфо
март 2001

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Название: Материалы на английском
Главные Пункты:
* Нефтяное пятно длиной 1 км обнаружено на морском месторождении Юго-Западный Тажигали (Казахстан). Причину, уровень утечки, а также возможные последствия пока точно неизвестны.
* Отчет о переговорах специального представителя президента США по вопросам Каспийского моря с президентом Казахстана
* Прокуратура Атырау расследует воздействие некотрых нефтяных компаний на окружающую среду региона;
* Власти Грузии, Турции, Казахстана, Азербайджана и США подписали меморандум о строительстве нефтепровода Баку-Джейхан;
* Канадская нефтяная компания Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd. планирует в ближайшие два года вложить 280 мил. долл. в проекты Казахстана;
* По просьбе Ирана, запланированный на 8-9 марта саммит прикаспийских государств в Туркменистане, отложен до начала апреля.
* Статья "Энергообеспечение: насколько ценной является каспийская нефть?"
(12.03.2001)


Полный Текст
Материалы на английском
Oil Spill Threatens Kazakhstan's Caspian Coast

ALMATY, Mar 13, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) A kilometer-long oil spill has been
discovered near the Caspian coast of the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan,
local government officials said Tuesday.

Oil began seeping out of two of five disused wells in southwest Tazhigali, in the
Atyrau region of western Kazakhstan, after they were flooded by a rise in the water
level of the Caspian Sea, a spokeswoman for the regional administration said.

The oil spill, which has spread more than one kilometer (mile) from the well and
is around five to 10 meters (15 to 30 feet) wide, is currently forming a layer
under the ice, spokeswoman Nurgul Baimenshina said.

"The wells were sealed by (the oil firm) Kazakhoil-Emba around 10 years ago. When
the level of the Caspian sea rose they were flooded under half a meter of water,"
she added.

"It is too early to say that it poses a threat. Some of the oil is frozen under
the ice. The biggest problem at the moment is that it is difficult to get access to
this place," Baimenshina said.

A commission had been set up to deal with the oil spill but experts have
recommended that action should only be taken once the ice has melted during the
next two months, the spokeswoman said.

It is feared that the spill could have serious consequences for the population and
wildlife of the region as well as for the sensitive environment of the Caspian
region.

Some media reports have suggested that the spill has already caused the death of
some animals, but Baimenshina denied this was the case in the Tazhigali region.
((c) 2001 Agence France Presse)

***
Kazakh News, March 2, 2001

U.S PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY ON CASPIAN ISSUES HELD TALKS WITH KAZAKH
PRESIDENT TODAY.

Elizabeth Jones - U.S. Presidential envoy on Caspian issues, arrived to Astana -
the capital, yesterday, (See Kazakh News, March 1, 2001). The same day, after
she met with Kazakh Premier Qasymzhomart Toqayev, a joint
American-Azerbaijani-Georgian-Kazakh memorandum on joint activities on
construction of Aqtau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, connecting West Kazakhstan
with Turkish port of Ceyhan, was signed by officials of the named countries, in
Astana. Today, March 2, Mrs. Jones held talks with Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev. At press conference held after her talks with Kazakh leader, she
told journalists: "...The issue really is the issue of timing. The producers
in Azerbaijan, the producers, when oil comes on line, of Kashagan, will need to
have a transportation route ready when the producing is ready. And President
Nazarbayev said just now in our meeting that he intends that early oil from
Kashagan would also use Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan because of the timing of the
production of oil from Kashagan." Mrs. Jones also expressed her satisfaction
with the fact Kazakhstan had agreed to fully participate in the
Aqtau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project.

***
Kazakh News, February 28, 2001

ATYRAU OBLAST PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE INVESTIGATES OPERATIONS OF OIL
COMPANIES IN THE REGION.

Correspondents of RFE/RL report that Prosecutor's Office of Atyrau Oblast
started investigating activities of some oil companies working in the region.
The main issue the Prosecutor's office pays attention in the region is the level
of affect of the oil companies' operations to the local environment. It was
reported by some news agencies of Kazakhstan that, for instance, an oil company
called ATS Petroleum International has developed about 456 tons of crude oil
without preliminary consultations with ecology control services last year. All
the illegally developed oil was sold to Germany reportedly. It was also
reported that some programs of U.S.- Kazakh joint venture Tengizchevroil are
checked by ecology control groups as well. Some projects of OKIOC consortium
are reportedly affecting the natural areas of salmon's migration routes. Also
operations of such oil companies as Atyrau-Munay, Makhat-Munay and others are
thoroughly controlled currently.



***


MEMORANDUM ON OIL PIPELINE SIGNED IN KAZAKHSTAN. Georgian, Azerbaijani, Turkish,
Kazakh, and U.S. officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Astana on 1 March "On the
Transport of Oil on the route Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan," Reuters reported. That document
could theoretically serve as the foundation for extending the planned Baku-Ceyhan export
pipeline, insofar as it provides the legal foundations for foreign companies extracting oil in
Kazakhstan to use that export route. But Kazakhstan has made no firm commitment to export a
specific amount of crude via Baku-Ceyhan, and Prime Minister Qasymzhomart Toqaev said
Kazakhstan would prefer to export oil via Iran. Kairgeldy Kabyldin, who is vice president of
KazTransOil, told Interfax on 1 March that construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be
economically viable only if a minimum of 20 million tons can be transported through it annually.
LF

CANADIAN OIL COMPANY OUTLINES FUTURE INVESTMENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN. Canada's
Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd. plans to invest $280 million in projects in Kazakhstan over the next
two years, Interfax quoted Marlo Thomas, who is president of the company's subsidiary in
Kazakhstan, as telling journalists in Almaty on 1 March. Some $30 million of that sum will be
invested in construction of a gas-fired power station that will be fueled by gas from the Kumkol oil
and gas field in southern Kazakhstan, according to Interfax on 27 February. Hurricane
Hydrocarbons extracted some 3.3 million tons of oil in Kazakhstan last year, almost one-third more
than in 1999, and plans to increase output in 2001 to 4 million tons. LF

***

PLANNED CASPIAN SUMMIT IN TURKMENISTAN POSTPONED. The summit of Caspian
littoral states planned for 8-9 March in the Turkmen port city of Turkmenbashi has been postponed
until early April at Iran's request, Reuters reported on 26 February quoting an unnamed Turkmen
government official. It had been hoped that summit participants would adopt an agreement on
the division of the sea into national sectors. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and special envoy
for the Caspian Viktor Kalyuzhnyi said on 23 February that at a meeting in Tehran on 21-22
February, deputy foreign ministers from the five littoral states had reached agreement on part of
the draft declaration to be endorsed at the summit, Interfax reported. Kalyuzhnyi also said that Iran
had made clear that it wants the summit postponed until after President Mohammad Khatami's
planned visit to Moscow in mid-March and the venue changed. LF

***

http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/bcsia/library.nsf/pubs/Pugliaresi

Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pugliaresi, Lucian. "Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?"
Cambridge, MA: Caspian Studies Program, January 2001.
For further information regarding this publication, contact Emily Goodhue
via email.

Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?
Lucian Pugliaresi

Lucian Pugliaresi is the president of LPI Consulting, Inc. in Washington,
D.C. LPI Consulting provides advisory services on petroleum developments and
environmental policy. Mr. Pugliaresi worked on energy security issues at the
National Security Council during the Reagan Administration.

* * *
Summary
The United States has invested considerable political resources with the
goal of developing Caspian Sea energy resources and ensuring they flow to
markets through countries that are friendly to the U.S. However, estimates
of the volumes of Caspian oil are quite modest. According to analysts,
Caspian oil will achieve peak production of between 3 and 5 million barrels
per day over the next 10 to 20 years. Even if Caspian oil development
potential improves, production from the region is not likely to meet even 5
percent of 2020 world demand.

Considering the assessments of modest quantities of Caspian oil, why has
this region received such high-level attention from Western governments? The
answer to this question lies in the field of energy security: additional
supplies, even at modest levels of output, can make an important
contribution to limiting the market power of the major producers as well as
reducing to some extent the percentage of world oil production subject to
disruption. Therefore, this marginal oil can bring about a lowering of
prices and can enhance energy security.

Background
Due to the concentration of low-cost reserves in the Persian Gulf, the
Saudis and some of the Gulf producers are likely to play a growing role in
regulating oil prices and may be in a position to exercise, or even be
politically motivated to exercise, considerable monopoly power on oil
prices. In recent years, the major Persian Gulf producers have been
successfully limiting output to sustain higher prices. Under these
circumstances, any new worldwide production ends up reducing the net demand
for Saudi and Gulf oil by an equal amount. Such shifts in net demand for
Gulf petroleum can act as a catalyst to encourage the Saudis to adopt a
lower price strategy. It is in these instances that new (marginal)
production can provide very large benefits by reducing the import costs for
all consuming countries across the entire volume of petroleum imports.

Thus, since the early 1990s the United States has attempted to diversify
energy sources through petroleum development among the successor states of
the Soviet Union. Among other foreign policy objectives in the region, the
U.S. has focused on oil production and transport because of its potential to
make an important contribution to U.S. energy security. Of particular
interest to U.S. policy makers are the oil and gas producing countries of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. In addition, Georgia and Turkey
have important roles as transit points for moving oil to western markets.
Turkey is also a principle consumer of oil and gas from the region.

U.S. policy initiatives to encourage new production have not been limited to
Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The U.S. has invested considerable
effort in encouraging institution building and investment-friendly
legislation in Russia to promote petroleum development there as well as a
host of similarly modest efforts in Latin America and Africa.

The Energy Security Problem
The energy security problem is a direct result of the concentration of low
cost petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf- a small, distant, and at times
unstable region. From the perspective of the major oil importing countries,
such a large concentration of low cost reserves presents two kinds of
vulnerabilities or risks.

The first vulnerability stems from the possibility that a relatively small
number of producers could restrict output to the world market, and as a
result, charge prices over the long term that are substantially higher than
those which would prevail in more competitive markets. One could argue that
restricting output and achieving higher prices is in fact the very purpose
of OPEC, although, until the 1999 price recovery, the organization had not
been very effective at achieving this since the late 1970's. Higher prices
result in wealth transfers from consuming countries to producing countries.
Of course, the reverse trend occurs when prices move downward.

An important consequence of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo was a structural
shift in the ownership and control of the vast Gulf resources. By changing
expectations on future production levels of the major Middle East oil
producers, the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo brought about a sustained increase
in the value of oil. As Middle East reserves were nationalized and
transferred to the control of the host countries, expectations for future
production from the region were scaled back and prices responded
accordingly.

The so-called second oil price shock in 1979 can be seen in a similar light,
as the Iranian Revolution sent a signal that the region was in for a period
of instability. The prior view that future output from Iran and Iraq would
expand substantially was no longer plausible. The point here is that in both
cases, prices were affected by changing expectations on future production
levels. In both cases, the severe economic losses experienced by the
consuming countries coupled with the fear of physical shortages led Western
countries to put into place a range of energy security initiatives, some of
which remain in effect today (e.g., strategic petroleum stocks).

The second vulnerability is the potential for a disruption in supplies,
either short or long term, to the world market. Such a disruption could
occur either from a conflict or revolution in a major producing region. An
interruption in Middle East supplies clearly would raise short-term prices
worldwide and bring about large wealth transfers from importers to
exporters. Whether a short-term disruption would lead to a medium or
long-term increase in prices would depend on whether a large volume of
reserves was removed from the market and on the speed and cost at which new
supplies could be developed. In any case, the long-term value of petroleum
would clearly shift upward substantially if access to the world's largest
low cost reserves were denied to the market. Any such price shift would
bring about severe economic dislocations and impose related security
concerns on the West.

A key feature of the world oil market is that oil is a fully integrated
commodity (e.g. factors affecting prices and flow in one place affect the
overall price of oil). Thus a disruption in supplies from the Persian Gulf
or a reemergence of restrictive production policies by Middle East oil
producers (as occurred after the 1998 price collapse) harms both the U.S.
and the other oil importers based on the economic value of petroleum in each
country's economy and not based upon the level of imports from specific
regions. In today's integrated market, a supply disruption anywhere leads to
a price increase everywhere. However, as long as a relatively small volume
of oil can adjust to price signals, supplies will be reallocated in very
short time periods. Accordingly, there is great importance to ensuring
diversity of suppliers.

To address these vulnerabilities, associated with the market power of
producers as well the potential for a disruption in supply, several policy
instruments are called for. Among the more important are:

1. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: The role of the SPR is to ameliorate the
costs of a disruption and dislocation to the domestic economy by releasing
supplies in an emergency and muting the price increases. Whether Western
governments can effectively manage this policy instrument is an open
question.

2. R&D: Research and development of alternative sources of energy. Such an
effort was viewed as highly important at one time, but now is relegated to
more modest levels. This effort is heavily dominated by conservation and
environmental interests and remains under $1 billion per year. There is
clearly an important role for government in undertaking long-term research
into alternative energy sources, but historical analysis suggests the
alternative fuels of the future will largely be driven by private sector
initiatives.

3. Sustaining Political/ Military Alliances in the Gulf: U.S. policy in the
Persian Gulf and with the Arab world is not a single purpose strategy. The
U.S. is a close ally of Israel, concerned about Iranian acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction, and containment of Iraq. However, within these
constraints, U.S. policy seeks to maintain a strong political/military
relationship with key producers, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE,
Oman. Such an approach seeks to keep the Gulf open to freely traded supplies
and it seems that the U.S. presence in the region acts as a force to lower
(but not necessarily eliminate) the chance of conflict in the Gulf.

Diversification of Supplies Outside the Persian Gulf: The Caspian
Contribution
While Caspian oil may provide only a small percentage of total world
production, since these new supplies are added "at the margin" they can have
disproportional impact on world oil prices and erode some of the political
control of the OPEC states. These additional supplies, even at modest levels
of output, can make an important contribution to limiting the market power
of the major producers as well as modestly reducing the percentage of world
oil production subject to disruption. Therefore, this marginal oil can bring
about price reductions and/or limit increases across the entire volume of
oil consumed by importing countries. Thus, a final component of U.S. energy
security strategy is the diversification of supplies to regions outside the
Persian Gulf, such as the Caspian Region. Even a modest reduction in world
oil prices offers large-scale benefits to a major oil-importing country like
the United States, which is likely to be importing 15 million barrels per
day in 2020.