Каспинфо март 2001 |
Название: Материалы на английском Главные Пункты: * Нефтяное пятно длиной 1 км обнаружено на морском месторождении Юго-Западный Тажигали (Казахстан). Причину, уровень утечки, а также возможные последствия пока точно неизвестны. * Отчет о переговорах специального представителя президента США по вопросам Каспийского моря с президентом Казахстана * Прокуратура Атырау расследует воздействие некотрых нефтяных компаний на окружающую среду региона; * Власти Грузии, Турции, Казахстана, Азербайджана и США подписали меморандум о строительстве нефтепровода Баку-Джейхан; * Канадская нефтяная компания Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd. планирует в ближайшие два года вложить 280 мил. долл. в проекты Казахстана; * По просьбе Ирана, запланированный на 8-9 марта саммит прикаспийских государств в Туркменистане, отложен до начала апреля. * Статья "Энергообеспечение: насколько ценной является каспийская нефть?" (12.03.2001) Полный Текст Материалы на английском Oil Spill Threatens Kazakhstan's Caspian Coast ALMATY, Mar 13, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) A kilometer-long oil spill has been discovered near the Caspian coast of the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, local government officials said Tuesday. Oil began seeping out of two of five disused wells in southwest Tazhigali, in the Atyrau region of western Kazakhstan, after they were flooded by a rise in the water level of the Caspian Sea, a spokeswoman for the regional administration said. The oil spill, which has spread more than one kilometer (mile) from the well and is around five to 10 meters (15 to 30 feet) wide, is currently forming a layer under the ice, spokeswoman Nurgul Baimenshina said. "The wells were sealed by (the oil firm) Kazakhoil-Emba around 10 years ago. When the level of the Caspian sea rose they were flooded under half a meter of water," she added. "It is too early to say that it poses a threat. Some of the oil is frozen under the ice. The biggest problem at the moment is that it is difficult to get access to this place," Baimenshina said. A commission had been set up to deal with the oil spill but experts have recommended that action should only be taken once the ice has melted during the next two months, the spokeswoman said. It is feared that the spill could have serious consequences for the population and wildlife of the region as well as for the sensitive environment of the Caspian region. Some media reports have suggested that the spill has already caused the death of some animals, but Baimenshina denied this was the case in the Tazhigali region. ((c) 2001 Agence France Presse) *** Kazakh News, March 2, 2001 U.S PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY ON CASPIAN ISSUES HELD TALKS WITH KAZAKH PRESIDENT TODAY. Elizabeth Jones - U.S. Presidential envoy on Caspian issues, arrived to Astana - the capital, yesterday, (See Kazakh News, March 1, 2001). The same day, after she met with Kazakh Premier Qasymzhomart Toqayev, a joint American-Azerbaijani-Georgian-Kazakh memorandum on joint activities on construction of Aqtau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, connecting West Kazakhstan with Turkish port of Ceyhan, was signed by officials of the named countries, in Astana. Today, March 2, Mrs. Jones held talks with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. At press conference held after her talks with Kazakh leader, she told journalists: "...The issue really is the issue of timing. The producers in Azerbaijan, the producers, when oil comes on line, of Kashagan, will need to have a transportation route ready when the producing is ready. And President Nazarbayev said just now in our meeting that he intends that early oil from Kashagan would also use Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan because of the timing of the production of oil from Kashagan." Mrs. Jones also expressed her satisfaction with the fact Kazakhstan had agreed to fully participate in the Aqtau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project. *** Kazakh News, February 28, 2001 ATYRAU OBLAST PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE INVESTIGATES OPERATIONS OF OIL COMPANIES IN THE REGION. Correspondents of RFE/RL report that Prosecutor's Office of Atyrau Oblast started investigating activities of some oil companies working in the region. The main issue the Prosecutor's office pays attention in the region is the level of affect of the oil companies' operations to the local environment. It was reported by some news agencies of Kazakhstan that, for instance, an oil company called ATS Petroleum International has developed about 456 tons of crude oil without preliminary consultations with ecology control services last year. All the illegally developed oil was sold to Germany reportedly. It was also reported that some programs of U.S.- Kazakh joint venture Tengizchevroil are checked by ecology control groups as well. Some projects of OKIOC consortium are reportedly affecting the natural areas of salmon's migration routes. Also operations of such oil companies as Atyrau-Munay, Makhat-Munay and others are thoroughly controlled currently. *** MEMORANDUM ON OIL PIPELINE SIGNED IN KAZAKHSTAN. Georgian, Azerbaijani, Turkish, Kazakh, and U.S. officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Astana on 1 March "On the Transport of Oil on the route Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan," Reuters reported. That document could theoretically serve as the foundation for extending the planned Baku-Ceyhan export pipeline, insofar as it provides the legal foundations for foreign companies extracting oil in Kazakhstan to use that export route. But Kazakhstan has made no firm commitment to export a specific amount of crude via Baku-Ceyhan, and Prime Minister Qasymzhomart Toqaev said Kazakhstan would prefer to export oil via Iran. Kairgeldy Kabyldin, who is vice president of KazTransOil, told Interfax on 1 March that construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be economically viable only if a minimum of 20 million tons can be transported through it annually. LF CANADIAN OIL COMPANY OUTLINES FUTURE INVESTMENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN. Canada's Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd. plans to invest $280 million in projects in Kazakhstan over the next two years, Interfax quoted Marlo Thomas, who is president of the company's subsidiary in Kazakhstan, as telling journalists in Almaty on 1 March. Some $30 million of that sum will be invested in construction of a gas-fired power station that will be fueled by gas from the Kumkol oil and gas field in southern Kazakhstan, according to Interfax on 27 February. Hurricane Hydrocarbons extracted some 3.3 million tons of oil in Kazakhstan last year, almost one-third more than in 1999, and plans to increase output in 2001 to 4 million tons. LF *** PLANNED CASPIAN SUMMIT IN TURKMENISTAN POSTPONED. The summit of Caspian littoral states planned for 8-9 March in the Turkmen port city of Turkmenbashi has been postponed until early April at Iran's request, Reuters reported on 26 February quoting an unnamed Turkmen government official. It had been hoped that summit participants would adopt an agreement on the division of the sea into national sectors. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and special envoy for the Caspian Viktor Kalyuzhnyi said on 23 February that at a meeting in Tehran on 21-22 February, deputy foreign ministers from the five littoral states had reached agreement on part of the draft declaration to be endorsed at the summit, Interfax reported. Kalyuzhnyi also said that Iran had made clear that it wants the summit postponed until after President Mohammad Khatami's planned visit to Moscow in mid-March and the venue changed. LF *** http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/bcsia/library.nsf/pubs/Pugliaresi Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pugliaresi, Lucian. "Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?" Cambridge, MA: Caspian Studies Program, January 2001. For further information regarding this publication, contact Emily Goodhue via email. Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil? Lucian Pugliaresi Lucian Pugliaresi is the president of LPI Consulting, Inc. in Washington, D.C. LPI Consulting provides advisory services on petroleum developments and environmental policy. Mr. Pugliaresi worked on energy security issues at the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. * * * Summary The United States has invested considerable political resources with the goal of developing Caspian Sea energy resources and ensuring they flow to markets through countries that are friendly to the U.S. However, estimates of the volumes of Caspian oil are quite modest. According to analysts, Caspian oil will achieve peak production of between 3 and 5 million barrels per day over the next 10 to 20 years. Even if Caspian oil development potential improves, production from the region is not likely to meet even 5 percent of 2020 world demand. Considering the assessments of modest quantities of Caspian oil, why has this region received such high-level attention from Western governments? The answer to this question lies in the field of energy security: additional supplies, even at modest levels of output, can make an important contribution to limiting the market power of the major producers as well as reducing to some extent the percentage of world oil production subject to disruption. Therefore, this marginal oil can bring about a lowering of prices and can enhance energy security. Background Due to the concentration of low-cost reserves in the Persian Gulf, the Saudis and some of the Gulf producers are likely to play a growing role in regulating oil prices and may be in a position to exercise, or even be politically motivated to exercise, considerable monopoly power on oil prices. In recent years, the major Persian Gulf producers have been successfully limiting output to sustain higher prices. Under these circumstances, any new worldwide production ends up reducing the net demand for Saudi and Gulf oil by an equal amount. Such shifts in net demand for Gulf petroleum can act as a catalyst to encourage the Saudis to adopt a lower price strategy. It is in these instances that new (marginal) production can provide very large benefits by reducing the import costs for all consuming countries across the entire volume of petroleum imports. Thus, since the early 1990s the United States has attempted to diversify energy sources through petroleum development among the successor states of the Soviet Union. Among other foreign policy objectives in the region, the U.S. has focused on oil production and transport because of its potential to make an important contribution to U.S. energy security. Of particular interest to U.S. policy makers are the oil and gas producing countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. In addition, Georgia and Turkey have important roles as transit points for moving oil to western markets. Turkey is also a principle consumer of oil and gas from the region. U.S. policy initiatives to encourage new production have not been limited to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The U.S. has invested considerable effort in encouraging institution building and investment-friendly legislation in Russia to promote petroleum development there as well as a host of similarly modest efforts in Latin America and Africa. The Energy Security Problem The energy security problem is a direct result of the concentration of low cost petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf- a small, distant, and at times unstable region. From the perspective of the major oil importing countries, such a large concentration of low cost reserves presents two kinds of vulnerabilities or risks. The first vulnerability stems from the possibility that a relatively small number of producers could restrict output to the world market, and as a result, charge prices over the long term that are substantially higher than those which would prevail in more competitive markets. One could argue that restricting output and achieving higher prices is in fact the very purpose of OPEC, although, until the 1999 price recovery, the organization had not been very effective at achieving this since the late 1970's. Higher prices result in wealth transfers from consuming countries to producing countries. Of course, the reverse trend occurs when prices move downward. An important consequence of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo was a structural shift in the ownership and control of the vast Gulf resources. By changing expectations on future production levels of the major Middle East oil producers, the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo brought about a sustained increase in the value of oil. As Middle East reserves were nationalized and transferred to the control of the host countries, expectations for future production from the region were scaled back and prices responded accordingly. The so-called second oil price shock in 1979 can be seen in a similar light, as the Iranian Revolution sent a signal that the region was in for a period of instability. The prior view that future output from Iran and Iraq would expand substantially was no longer plausible. The point here is that in both cases, prices were affected by changing expectations on future production levels. In both cases, the severe economic losses experienced by the consuming countries coupled with the fear of physical shortages led Western countries to put into place a range of energy security initiatives, some of which remain in effect today (e.g., strategic petroleum stocks). The second vulnerability is the potential for a disruption in supplies, either short or long term, to the world market. Such a disruption could occur either from a conflict or revolution in a major producing region. An interruption in Middle East supplies clearly would raise short-term prices worldwide and bring about large wealth transfers from importers to exporters. Whether a short-term disruption would lead to a medium or long-term increase in prices would depend on whether a large volume of reserves was removed from the market and on the speed and cost at which new supplies could be developed. In any case, the long-term value of petroleum would clearly shift upward substantially if access to the world's largest low cost reserves were denied to the market. Any such price shift would bring about severe economic dislocations and impose related security concerns on the West. A key feature of the world oil market is that oil is a fully integrated commodity (e.g. factors affecting prices and flow in one place affect the overall price of oil). Thus a disruption in supplies from the Persian Gulf or a reemergence of restrictive production policies by Middle East oil producers (as occurred after the 1998 price collapse) harms both the U.S. and the other oil importers based on the economic value of petroleum in each country's economy and not based upon the level of imports from specific regions. In today's integrated market, a supply disruption anywhere leads to a price increase everywhere. However, as long as a relatively small volume of oil can adjust to price signals, supplies will be reallocated in very short time periods. Accordingly, there is great importance to ensuring diversity of suppliers. To address these vulnerabilities, associated with the market power of producers as well the potential for a disruption in supply, several policy instruments are called for. Among the more important are: 1. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: The role of the SPR is to ameliorate the costs of a disruption and dislocation to the domestic economy by releasing supplies in an emergency and muting the price increases. Whether Western governments can effectively manage this policy instrument is an open question. 2. R&D: Research and development of alternative sources of energy. Such an effort was viewed as highly important at one time, but now is relegated to more modest levels. This effort is heavily dominated by conservation and environmental interests and remains under $1 billion per year. There is clearly an important role for government in undertaking long-term research into alternative energy sources, but historical analysis suggests the alternative fuels of the future will largely be driven by private sector initiatives. 3. Sustaining Political/ Military Alliances in the Gulf: U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf and with the Arab world is not a single purpose strategy. The U.S. is a close ally of Israel, concerned about Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and containment of Iraq. However, within these constraints, U.S. policy seeks to maintain a strong political/military relationship with key producers, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE, Oman. Such an approach seeks to keep the Gulf open to freely traded supplies and it seems that the U.S. presence in the region acts as a force to lower (but not necessarily eliminate) the chance of conflict in the Gulf. Diversification of Supplies Outside the Persian Gulf: The Caspian Contribution While Caspian oil may provide only a small percentage of total world production, since these new supplies are added "at the margin" they can have disproportional impact on world oil prices and erode some of the political control of the OPEC states. These additional supplies, even at modest levels of output, can make an important contribution to limiting the market power of the major producers as well as modestly reducing the percentage of world oil production subject to disruption. Therefore, this marginal oil can bring about price reductions and/or limit increases across the entire volume of oil consumed by importing countries. Thus, a final component of U.S. energy security strategy is the diversification of supplies to regions outside the Persian Gulf, such as the Caspian Region. Even a modest reduction in world oil prices offers large-scale benefits to a major oil-importing country like the United States, which is likely to be importing 15 million barrels per day in 2020. |