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Каспинфо март 2001 |
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Название: Материалы на английском - I Главные Пункты: * Планируемый на июнь визит Г. Алиева в Иран может способствовать улучшению отношений между странами, в частности по вопросу статуса Каспийского моря; * Интервью с Говардом Чейзом (Howard Chase), директором по международным связям компании BP Amoco. Главная тема - перспективы строительства Баку -Джейхан. * В преддверии международного Дня Земли (15-22 апреля 2001 г.) Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL) предлагает всем природоохранным организациям провести подводные и прибрежные акции с целью привлечения внимания общественности разных стран к проблемам сохранения морей. (20.03.2001) Полный Текст Материалы на английском - I Материалы на английском - I *** BUSINESS & ECONOMICS March 19, 2001 CASPIAN BASIN COMPTETITION KICKING INTO HIGH GEAR Afshin Molavi: 3/14/01 Azerbajani President Heidar Aliyev on March 12 began a state visit to Turkey. The same day, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was wrapping up a landmark summit meeting in Moscow with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. The travels of these two key Caspian region leaders indicate that the competition over the regionнs vast oil and gas resources is kicking into high gear. A key issue in the battle for control over natural resources and export routes centers on the territorial division of the Caspian Sea. A meeting of the five Caspian Basin states с Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan с was originally planned for March 8-9 in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat, but it had to be postponed to allow for further bilateral talks. Agreement on Caspian delimitation appears as elusive as ever. Iran is emerging as a powerful force in the search for a Caspian settlement, and does not appear content with the current thinking on territorial division. Under the current framework, Iran would gain a 14 percent share. Iran has been seeking to persuade the littoral states to divide the resources equally, 20 percent per country. Azerbaijan, along with Russia and Kazakhstan, has expressed opposition. Turkmenistan, a large natural gas supplier to Iran, has sided with Tehran's view, though Iranian diplomats grumble privately that Ashgabat's support is more talk than action. During his Moscow visit, however, Khatami appears to have scored a significant diplomatic triumph by apparently convincing Russia to reevaluate its Caspian position. A joint declaration issued by Khatami and Putin said that both Iran and Russia will not recognize any Caspian deal unless it receives unanimous approval from all five states. Although some Caspian observers still do not expect Iran to achieve its ultimate 20 percent aim, the Khatami-Putin meeting might pave the way for an acceptable solution. Caspian policy watchers say that Russia might be prepared to rewrite the division map to grant Iran an extra 1 or 2 percent. Azerbaijani leaders have assailed the joint Iranian-Russian declaration. Ultimately, it may take a bilateral meeting between Aliyev and Khatami to iron out remaining Caspian differences. Aliyev is scheduled to visit Iran next June, but Caspian policy watchers in Tehran may be reluctant to mark their calendars. Three previous "scheduled" visits over the past two years have been postponed over policy differences, and the two countries continue to gripe over a range of issues from Caspian Sea resource-sharing to geopolitical alliance-building and, even, electricity distribution. Even if a Caspian agreement is brokered, Iran-Azerbaijan relations are likely to remain rocky. Both sides have a laundry list of grievances, beginning with geopolitical concerns. Iran accuses Azerbaijan of opening up the Caspian to Israel due to its close ties to the Jewish state. It also complains that Azerbaijan's ties to NATO offer the North Atlantic alliance a foothold in the region, a criticism echoed by Moscow. Azerbaijan, in its delicate attempts to break away from the Russian orbit by increasing ties with the United States, finds Iran's constant criticism disruptive. One Azerbaijani official put it this way: "We are surrounded by Russia and Iran, two big states with big armies. It makes sense to seek alliances elsewhere." Russian-Iranian relations will play an important role in the course of ties between Baku and Tehran. Caspian observers in Tehran have said that a conciliatory approach toward Russia could strengthen ties between the two states and undercut the regional influence of the United States, by lessening the power of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The issue of pipelines also strains ties. Iran is angered by Azerbaijan's reluctance to support a pipeline plan through the Islamic Republic, even though Western oil companies have backed the idea. The Iran News daily reported that, in retaliation for lack of support from Baku, Iran cut off electrical supplies in late October 2000 to the Nakhichevan autonomous region that borders northern Iran. Iran provides up to 60 percent of the Azerbaijani exclave's electricity. The cut-off personally angered Aliyev, who hails from Nakhichevan. Later, it emerged that the electricity cut-off was prompted not so much by pipeline politics, but by Iran's frustration with slow debt payments from Azerbaijan on a power-for-diesel fuel deal for which Tehran says Baku still owes $45 million. And the list goes on. Azerbaijan says Iran is too close to Armenia. Azerbaijan's ambassador to Iran Abbas Ali Hassanov recently said publicly: "Why does Iran have relations with Armenia, which occupies 20 percent of our territory (Nagorno Karabakh), expelled 1 million Azerbaijanis, and are these people not Muslim?" Ignoring Baku's concerns, Iran, along with Greece, recently signed a tripartite agreement with Armenia pledging increased commercial and political cooperation. Iran also complains privately of what they view as Israeli-inspired attempts to incite Iran's large Azerbaijani community. Up to 25 percent of Iranians are ethnic Azerbaijanis. Like most Iranians, ethnic Azerbaijanis are frustrated with the deteriorating economy and the slow pace of promised political reforms, but there is little genuine support for an irredentist movement. Amid all of these spats - large and small - there also exists a fundamental mistrust on both sides that hamper the improvement of ties. A Western oil consultant familiar with Azerbaijani official thinking put it this way: "Aliyev finds the Islamic Republic to be arrogant and meddlesome. He also personally dislikes Iranians. He knows he has to deal with them, but he would just as soon see them disappear entirely." An Iranian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described official Tehran's view toward Azerbaijan: "There are many that think Azerbaijan is just this little state that goes calling to Israel and Mossad and the United States for help and is bought and sold by oil interests and US interests. We have trouble trusting them as Caspian partners, because they would rather be American partners." Still, despite the mistrust and the occasional bouts of heated rhetoric, signs have emerged that a slight thawing may be underway. In early February, Aliyev surprised local observers by attending a ceremony in Baku commemorating the 22nd anniversary of Iran's revolution. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has, in turn, sent greetings to Aliyev through intermediaries. Last month, cooperation agreements were signed between local chambers of commerce and a customs agreement easing taxes on road vehicles was agreed. Nevertheless, it will take more than customs agreements and chambers of commerce signings to overcome the real differences between the two states. Come June, Aliyev may show up in Tehran after all, but it remains to be seen if he will have a pleasant visit. Editor's Note: Afshin Molavi is a journalist based in Tehran, Iran. His work has appeared in the Washington Post. Email this article Posted March 14, 2001 © Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org *** Q & A March 19, 2001 Oil Executive Explores Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Prospects, As Caspian States Wrestle Over Export Routes Q&A with Howard Chase of BP Amoco: 3/15/01 The full potential of Caspian Basin energy resources remains untapped, as the five Caspian Basin states с Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan с continue to wrestle over key issues related to oil and gas exports. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Despite repeated delays, preliminary work is proceeding on the main Western-backed export route, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The multi-billion-dollar pipeline project, which is tentatively scheduled for completion in 2004, received a boost March 2, when Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbaev pledged that oil from the East Kashagan field, expected to start pumping in 2005, would be exported via Baku-Ceyhan. Further enhancing Baku-Ceyhanнs prospects is the March 12 deal under which Turkey agreed to import gas from Azerbaijanнs Shahk-Deniz field. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will ultimately be built. For an international perspective on pipeline prospects, EurasiaNet spoke recently to Howard Chase, Director of International Affairs for BP Amoco, based in Washington, D.C. The text of the conversation follows. EurasiaNet: Perhaps the best place to start is to review the status of the initial six months of engineering work currently under way for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Chase: I appreciate your interest. Your question refers to the $25 million basic engineering phase that started in December. It is going very well; it is at the halfway point now and should be completed on schedule in May. EurasiaNet: Do you anticipate that the twelve-month follow-on phase will indeed be conducted? Chase: We are confident that the initial six-month study phase will provide the information necessary for BPнs partners in the pipeline to take the decision to go to the next stage, that is, to conduct the subsequent twelve-month detailed engineering phase. EurasiaNet: Would the decision to conduct the detailed twelve-month engineering phase be equivalent to a decision to build the pipeline? Chase: Let me offer an analogy. It is rather like the three stages of building a house. In the first stage, where we are now in the six-month study, you look around the land, draw the sketches and work out the approximate cost of what you might like to build. In the second part of the work, which would be the detailed engineering phase, you bring in the architects, decide where the drains and power lines go, do the detailed engineering plans and costings and so on. But generally you only get to that stage if you feel that you really want to build the house. So a decision to move to the detailed engineering implies a great deal of confidence in the project. The third stage is, of course, the actual construction. EurasiaNet: How do you account, then, for the widespread media and academic skepticism concerning the prospects for the pipeline? Chase: The region is geopolitically very interesting, and there can be many opinions about it from that standpoint. But on technical questions, for example about how or where to drill subsea wells, there tend to be fewer voices and greater consensus. The real indicator of whether the pipeline will be built is whether investors put their resources into it, because without investors there will be no pipeline. I might add that some observers seem unclear about the distinction between the costs of the pipeline and its economics. The most economic solution to a problem is not necessarily the least expensive. EurasiaNet: That is not widely understood. Would you explain the difference between pipeline economics and pipeline cost? Chase: The economics of the pipeline involve such considerations as the timing, volumes and value of the oil at the delivery point, that is, at the other end of the pipeline. BTC delivers oil in large quantities on a predictable basis to a top-class deep-water port with open access to world markets. This greatly enhances the value side of the equation. Also, do not forget that we will spend four dollars offshore in the Caspian for every dollar we spend on the pipeline. Pipeline construction is not even the lionнs share of the total investment; in fact, it almost never is. The basic question is not about investment in the pipeline, but rather about identifying the most timely and secure route for getting the oil to market. An exclusive focus on the cost of the pipeline itself ignores these other economic aspects of the overall investment project of which the pipeline is only a part. EurasiaNet: Is there any relation between the BTC oil pipeline and the development of the Shakh-Deniz gas-and-condensate field? Some observers think that the condensate will go into the BTC pipeline, and is in fact required to make the pipeline commercial. Chase: All I can say is that this logic is not the way we look at it from within BP. Shakh-Deniz is a major gas discovery irrespective of the condensate content. It can go ahead only with a serious long-term gas sales agreement into Turkey. That is currently under negotiation and is an important piece of business in its own right. We are proceeding with the offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oilfield on the basis of what we know about ACG. [The ACG field is the "Contract of the Century" being developed by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), of which BP is the operator and largest share-holder. ACG oil is expected to go into the BTC pipeline.] If we can bring additional volumes to the BTC pipeline from elsewhere than ACG, then they will be very welcome; but they are not necessary to make the basic economics of the pipeline work. EurasiaNet: So you are not relying on East Kashagan oil from Kazakhstan to make BTC economical either? Chase: No, that is simply not the case. Tengiz oil will already very soon begin going through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) across southern Russia to Novorossiisk. The availability of a South Caspian route would present an element of competition to the CPC pipeline. Kazakhstan might well appreciate that. But if you put yourself in an investorнs position, you would see that the decision on BTC can be made only on the basis of known resources in the Azerbaijan area. Clearly, if the pipeline can be built on that basis, then it would present a very good and economically attractive route for other oil as well, such as from Kazakhstan. EurasiaNet: Some observers speculate that BP has to say that BTC will be built in order to get Turkey to take Shakh-Deniz gas. Chase: From where I sit, the realities are really much simpler. ACG is a world-class oilfield. We wish to carry on developing it and get the oil to market. Our priority is to progress with the development of the ACG field, coupled with the BTC pipeline. However, we also believe that the Shakh-Deniz gas will sell very successfully into the Turkish market. EurasiaNet: Does the recent upheaval in the Turkish political and financial system affect your business environment? Chase: We are content to take a long-term view. Our understanding is that there is a very wide range of consensus within Turkey, that the successful construction and commercial operation of BTC is very much in the national interest. EurasiaNet: What about the situation in Georgia, which some observers view as unstable? Chase: Both Georgia and Azerbaijan, as sovereign states, likewise have a rightful interest in the long-term success of this project. We understand that in both these countries, as in Turkey, there is a wide consensus that the BTC project is in the national interest. Indeed, there is a solid framework of multilateral intergovernmental agreements [signed in Istanbul in November 1999] that the three national parliaments have ratified, and which bind these states contractually much like international treaties would. EurasiaNet: Do you have a view concerning the reported statement by Russiaнs deputy foreign minister Viktor Kaluzhnyi, who is also President Putinнs special envoy on Caspian affairs, that the BTC is not a threat to Russian interests because BTC oil will go to the United States, whereas Russiaнs pipeline strategy targets other markets? Chase: We would welcome the participation of Russian energy companies in the construction of the pipeline as well as their commitment of quantities of oil to it. Editorнs Note: This interview was conducted by Dr. Robert M. Cutler: rmc@alum.mit.edu. Cutler is a research fellow at the Institute of European and Russian Studies, Carleton University. Posted March 15, 2001 © Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org *** Date: 3/14/01 1:48 PM From: Nana JANASHIA Greetings from the Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL)! I am writing to invite your organization/institution to participate in an inexpensive and effective marine conservation public outreach opportunity called Dive In To Earth Day. Dive In To Earth Day is an international Earth Day celebration offering hundreds of underwater and shore activities all over the world during the week of Earth Day, April 15-22, 2001. Last year, Earth Day (April 22), the most popular global environmental campaign in history, celebrated its 30th anniversary. Most Earth Day activities focus on land-issues. In order to ensure that this powerful and effective global public awareness campaign included the other 72% of the planet, the first ever Dive In To Earth Day was successfully launched. Over 200 Dive In activities were organized at dive sites in over 35 countries involving thousands of divers and marine enthusiasts. Dive In To Earth Day 2001 is a collaborative effort that will engage divers, snorkelers, NGOs, scientists, dive equipment manufacturers and retailers, dive operators, travel companies, teachers, students, zoos, aquariums and marine enthusiasts by providing them with the opportunity to participate in and/or organize an activity. Each event that is posted on the Dive In site will automatically be posted on the Earth Day Network site. This year, with your participation, this event can grow in popularity. By joining Dive In you can contribute to this unified message which aims to raise public awareness of marine issues and help increase media coverage of the Dive In event. The more events there are, the more noteworthy Dive In is in the eyes of the press. Already, James Cameron (Titanic), William Shatner (Star Trek), Peter Benchley (Jaws) and Craig Ferguson (Drew Carey Show), Jean Michel Cousteau (and more) have lent their names in support of Dive In. CORAL is coordinating the event which is co-sponsored by Rodale's Scuba Diving Magazine, Center for Marine Conservation, Padi AWARE Foundation, Earth Day Network, Reef Check, Reef Ball Foundation, Dive Equipment and Marketing Association, The Ocean Project and Oceanwatch. It's easy to Dive In! We are asking your group to organize a local marine-based activity during the week of Earth Day and post it on the Dive In web site. CORAL already has a web site where Dive In activities can be posted and free publicity tools for organizers. There is a Dive In logo that can be downloaded from the web site, a sample press release that can be copied and pasted onto your letterhead, suggestions for activities with catchy names, and some "how to" tips from other groups who have organized activities. Plus, for each event posted on the Dive In site, the organizer is entered in a raffle with some great prizes (see web site http://divein.coralreefalliance.org for a list of prizes). There are also T-shirts and posters available for sale. Examples of Dive In activities include: --underwater clean-ups --fish and coral surveys --installing mooring buoys --making artificial reefs --beach/shore cleanups --kids art contests --tabling booths at Earth Day fairs (there will be downloadable Dive In flyers on the web) If you are unable to organize a local activity, you can still Dive In! --help promote Dive In by posting the Dive In logo on your web site with a link --announcing Dive In on your list serve --post Dive In information in your newsletters, mailings and publications (photos available) --tell your colleagues about Dive In --send out the Dive In press release to your media contacts (it's posted on the web site) I hope you will take advantage of this public awareness opportunity by organizing a Dive In event within your community. The more Dive In events there are, the louder our collective voice will be in raising concern and focusing attention on marine conservation issues. Thank you for your time and please feel free to contact me for more information. I can be reached at (510) 848-0110, ext. 313 Pacific Standard Time. Regards, Anita Daley -- Anita Daley Education and Outreach Coordinator The Coral Reef Alliance 2014 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, CA 94704 (510) 848-0110 (ext. 313) (510) 848-3720 (fax) http://divein.coralreefalliance.org |