КаспИнфо

Каспинфо
октябрь 2000

Название: Материалы на английском
Главные Пункты:
* Информация о строительстве морских и береговых сегментов "Голубого потока".
* Приглашение к участию в проекте ЮНЕПКОМ и ИСАР по составлению Справочника организаций и программ, работающих над решением экологических проблем в Каспийском регионе. Прием заявок до 1 декабря 2000 г.
(20.10.2000)

Полный Текст
Материалы на английском
МАТЕРИАЛЫ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ
*****
INFORMATION
on marine and seaside segments of gas pipeline Russia - Turkey
("Blue Stream")

The main purpose of the authors of the given document was the intention to justify their concern
with probable ecological negative and disastrous effects of construction and exploitation of a
technically unique and dangerous pipeline (see page 60 of "The Conclusions of the state environmental
review of feasibility study of construction of the pipeline Russia - Turkey (maritime version)" in unique
natural conditions of the Black Sea, all thickness of which (deeper than 100-200m) is contaminated
with hydrogen sulphite in lethally dangerous concentration.
It would be naif to suppose, that the knowledge available today allows to describe in details the
natural and anthropogenic factors which creat a threat of disastrous effects for the environment as a
result of their interaction with the gas pipeline. This natural uncertainty of scientific knowledge in
combination with world uniqueness and significance of the Black Sea and technical uniqueness of the
designed facility make an apparent and unpredictable in scales threat of the gas pipeline "Blue Stream "
in its maritime version for all Black Sea countries, for the whole coastal population.

I. MARINE SEGMENT

1. Route location
1.1. The marine segment of the gas pipeline starts from the tract "Drovyanaya schel" in 5 kms to the
southeast from the resort settlement Arkhipo-Osipovka and approximately in 2 kms to the northwest of
the health resort Inal. The marine segment endes in the city of Samsun (Turkey).
1.2. Project expansion - 396 kms. From them the pipe line will pass through approximately 11 kms
of the Russian shelf (depth up to 100 m), about 50-60 kms - on a continental slope (depth from 100 up
to 2000 m). Further up to the foot of a turkish continental slope, it will cross the abyssal plain of the
Black Sea with depthes up to 2115 m. The route on the turkish continental slope and shelf is designed
to expand for about 120 kms.
1.3. A large part of the route of the gas pipeline is designed in the international waters. Except the
segments of the Russian and Turkish 12-mile territorial waters, the segment of the international waters
will make 340 kms or 87 % of of the entire marine segment.
2. Technical characteristics of the gas pipeline and its marine segment.
2.1. Project capacity - 16 billion cubic metres a year or 43,8 million cubic metres/24 hours .
2.2. Upstream pressure of the pipe line marine segment - compressor plant (hereinafter - CP)
"Beregovaya" - 25 MPascal (250at). Downstream pressure - CP "Samsun" - 5,4 MPascal (54 at).
Pressure drop in the pipe line - about 0,05 MPascal (0,5 at) for a kilometer. Upstream pressure - CP
"Beregovaya" - in augmented mode - 35 MPascal (350 at). Temperature of gas at entrance - +57?C, at
exit - +1?C.
2.3. Two versions of pipeline laying are considered in the project:
- 1 branch with inner diameter of 700mm;
- 2 branches with inner diameter of 534 mms.
2.4. longitudinal welded tubes of steel APT-5 X70 with trizonal polymer hydraulic seal with
general width of 500 microns (0.5 mms). The anodic protection is envisioned. From the practice of
underwater works in the Black Sea it is known, that the alloy steel made items are also subject to
corrosive attack of dissolved hydrogen sulphide.
2.5. Today the world experience of construction of deep water gas pipelines is limited to depthes
less than 1600 m. A record example is 101-km gas pipeline made in normal ocean waters of Mexican
bay outside the zone of hydrosulphuric contamination.
2.6. It is necessary to underline a missed by many (and kept secret by the authors of the project)
circumstance, that during the first 80-90 kms of the pipe line the gas pressure will exceed the external
hydrostatic pressure. The excess of internal pressure on the edge of the shelf will make about 23
MPascal (230 at), at the depth of 1000 m (16 kms from the shore) - 14 MPascal (140 at) and at the foot
of the continental slope (about 50 kms from shore) it will make 2 MPascal (20 at). A similar situation is
on the segment of the turkish continental slope and shelf with a general expansion of about 100 kms.
However overpressures in the pipe line there do not exceed 5 MPascal (50 at).
3. Geologic characteristics of the route and probable effects on the pipe line. The bottom of the
Black Sea along the route of the gas pipeline has a polysurface, steep gradients (up to 18°) and is
composed by nonsteady geologic formation. It is stipulated by latest neotectonic processes saturated
with energy on the shelf and continental slope of the Caucasian part of the Black Sea.
3.1. These an intensive accumulation of young silts takes place. Their drop happens partially as a
part of system of fissile submarine canyons, partially at sluggish creeps of large weights of nonlithified
silts, and also at activation of underwater landslides passing into nudrock and mud flows (see page 67-
68 of "The Conclusion of the state environmental review"). Large density and speed of these flows
causes their large energy, sufficient for destruction even of high-strength heavy wall tubes of the gas
pipeline.
3.2. The neotectonic motions of earth crust in the band of Caucasian continental slope generate
here centers of earthquakes with force of 8-10 balls in the epicentre, that is enough for direct
destruction of the gas pipeline. However even weak seismic fluctuations (their recurrence is much
higher) are capable to originate the mentioned above geological processes. The seismic threat to the
turkish shelf and slope is confirmed by recent seismic events in Turkey.
3.3. In case of affection of the pipe line by small-scale or peripheral parts of water-ground flows,
the thin (0,5 mms) hydraulic seal of tubes will be most probably destroyed; this in conditions of a high
corrosivity of hydrosulphuric Black Sea water (9-14 mg/l) in short time will lead to destruction of the
pipe line walls.
Besides such flows are capable to create vast holes under the pipe line or to bridge it over by the
ground, which has dropped out of a flow.
3.4. Whithin the territory of the Caucasian continental slope and its foot it was found have found
out the availability of diapir folding (often expressed in bottom relif), development of intensive gas and
hydrate saturation of bottom sediments, there are featuries of mud volcanism (see page 67-68
"Conclusion the of state environmental review"). Thermal and mechanical effects of the pipe line can
result in change of strength properties of bottom sediments, that in turn will initiate mechanical
pressure in walls of the pipe line , increasing the risk of its destruction.
3.5. Different opinions of experts on scales and recurrence of the indicated geologic phenomena
are lawful. However their existance is confirmed by numerous observations. In particular, the
hydrographic service of the Black Sea Navy has captured powerful underwater movings of grounds in
area of Cape Idokopas (approximately in 30 kms to the North-west of the a marine segment of the gas
pipeline), noticed due to a breakaway of a submarine connection cable and formation of tsunami-like
waves registered by tide gauges.
4. Gas breakthrough - script of catastrophe.
In item 2.6 it have already been mentioned, that contrary to broadcasting assurances of the creators,
owners and supporters of the project "Blue streem" that at the bottom of Black Sea the gas
breakthrough is not possible, almost 170 kms of the pipe line will be under essential excessive internal
pressure. At that, both segments, Turkish and in particular Russian, are designed with the limits of
composite geological and consequently dangerous parts of the route (see p.3). However the destruction
of the pipe line can be provoqued not only by natural processes, but also by wars, military exercises,
acts of terrorism, breach of the gasket technology and maintenance of the gas pipeline and also random
effects of different activities at the water area.
4.1. Gas breakthrough from the pipe line on the shelf will lead to the emission of tens millions
cubic metres (according to tentative estimations - more than 50 million cubic meters) of compress gas
into the water mass, and then into the atmosphere . The spontaneous combustion of gas is very probable
due to electrostatic effects in a cloud of spray above the emission. The combustion of gas can have an
explosive character. The high probability of this is confirmed by numerous cases of spontaneous
combustion and detonations of gas at eruption of mud volcanos (including underwater ones) in
Azerbaidzhan, on Kerch and Taman peninsulas. Rise and intermixing of water strata by gas will carry
away friable silty precipitations from the sea floor. The scales of water contamination then are
comparable to consequences of a strong gale. It is admitted even by the developers of the project.
However, they miss the fact, that the storm contamination of seawater is localized in a coastal area and
its width seldom exceeds 0,5-0,7 kms. The width of the shelf (see item 1.1) in the pipeline band is 11
kms, and a sea here is habitable up to depth more than 100 m, and the biota is not adapted to powerful
mud loads.
4.2. Destruction of the pipe line and gas breakthrough on the continental slope are possible for the
reasons, indicated in item 3, on all its extent up to the point, where internal pressure in the gas pipeline
is equal to the external hydrostatic pressure (see item 2.6).
At gas breakthrough at the depth of 1000 m (approximately 15 kms from the shore), where the
overpressure in the pipe line is of 14 MPascal (140 at) more than 30 mln cubic meters of gas will be
thrown out into the water strata, and then into the atmosphere. Rising to the sea surface, the gas will
carry away about 600 thousand cubic metres of water due to the air-lift effect , contaminated with
hydrogen sulphite (H2S concentration - 9-14 mg/l). One part of hydrogen sulphide will be degased in
the atmosphere, and another part will destroy all biota in the inhabited 200-m layer around the
catastrophe epicentre. Together with water, huge quantities of bottom silty precipitations also
containing hydrogen sulphite will be raised. A spontaneous combustion of mixed gas and explosive
processes at gas burst in atmosphere can take place with a high scale of probability as well as at gas
breakthrough on the shelf.
4.3. Geologic characteristics of the turkish shelf and continental slope (see page 69 "Conclusion
the of state environmental review") and also the overpressure in the pipe line, since the 290th km of the
pipe line, reaching here 5 Mpascal, make possible the destruction of the pipe line and gas burst in this
part of the "Blue Stream " as well.
4.4. The destruction of the pipe line within the Black Sea abyssal plaine (approximately from 90 up
to 290 kms of the route) can take place as a result of mud vulcano activity, softenings and fluctuations
of base grounds because of their degasification and decomposition of gas hydrates, which can be
contained in base grounds. However only on this interval of the route the gas burst in water strata is not
possible due to the exuberant external pressure of water. In this case even at small disturbance of air-
tightness, the pipe line will be supplied with water at pressure up to 8 Mpascal (80 atm).
Near-bottom thermobaric conditions and large amounts of compressed gas are congenial for the
creatuion of powerful gas-hydrate plugs in the pipe line. The presence of hydrogen sulphide in the
water can play the role of catalyst in this process, despite of the inhibiting effect of water salinity. The
removal of stypage of the pipe line by gas hydrates is a rather intricate problem, it is technically
possible only at a large distance from the entry.
4.5. In case of mass gas breakthrough (see item 4.1.-4.3.) the character of the Black Sea streams
will promote the carrying out of raised hydrogen-sulphide water and suspended matters to the Russian
resort coast and further to Crimea (Ukraine). In case of breakthrough in the turkish part of the sea in
addition to the turkish coast the coast of Georgia can suffer.
The meteorological conditions of the catastrophe can aggravate its effect owing to windward flood
of hydrogen sulphide in the populated coastline, found in the atmosphere above the epicentre of the
breakthrough or inflammable methane and products of its combustion - at breakthrough on the shelf
(see item 4.1. and 4.2.) Besides, effects of gas breakthroughes from the pipe line described in item 4.1.
and 4.2. are dangerous for navigation, specially for passenger and tourist routes, located from 10 up to
50 kms from shores.
The character of development, the scales of negative and disastrous effects of gas breakthrough in
the pipe line at the bottom of Black Sea can be much more divers and intensive, than the mentioned
above examples. The necessity of a more detailed research assessment of consequences of damage and
destruction of the pipe line on the sea bottom is recognized by experts (see page 92 of "The
Conclusions of the state environmental review").
5. International legal and political aspects of the project "Blue Stream" (maritime version).
5.1. Russia, being historically a Black Sea state, participates in international conventions and
agreements on ecological safety of water areas and all the Black Sea basin. In Bukharest, in 1972 with
the participation of Russia the Convention of 6 Black Sea countries about the protection of the Black
Sea against contamination was developed and signed. With the participation of Russia is set up and
works the Black Sea Environmental Program (BSEP). This organization generated important
documents and made them signed by the ministers of nature protection departments of six Black Sea
countries. Among them "Black Sea Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis" and "Strategic action plan on
environmental sanitation and protection of the Black Sea". In these documents is underlined the
transboundary character of ecological processes and threats, bound with them in exclusively self-
contained Black Sea basin, in which practically any environmental negative event, process or risk
affects the concerns of all Black Sea countries and their population. The data mentioned above show a
high degree of probability of negative and disastrous environmental effects of the Black Sea gas
pipeline "Blue Stream", that can affect the concerns not only of the countries - participants of the
project, but also of the entire Black Sea region. In this connection it is clear, that the narrow approach to
the creation and implementation of the project "Blue Stream" of the "Gazprom" leadership contradicts
not only international obligations of Russia, but also its long-term geopolitical interests.
5.2. It is known, that alternative versions of deliveries of the Russian gas in Turkey were also
considered. The "Eastern" version envisioned the construction of a gas pipeline through the territory of
Georgia and (or) Armenia. The "Western" one required the extension of already operational pipe line
system on territory of Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria with an output on the european part of
Turkey.
Both versions, unlike the marine one, are feasible with the help of conventional, tested and reliable
technologies. Both versions, apart from adjustment of acceptable economic relations with Turkey,
would provide long-term strengthening of Russia's positions in its bordering countries. This apparent
circumstance has not found reflection in the project of Gazprom "Blue Stream" (maritim