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Каспинфо декабрь 1999 |
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Название: Материалы на английском языке Главные Пункты: * Американская компания начинает добычу нефти в Грузии. * Украина ускоряет строительство Евразийского коридора транспорта нефти. * За Чеченской трагедией стоят нефтяные интересы. * и другие материалы (08.12.1999) Полный Текст Материалы на английском языке KAZAKH OIL CONSORTIUM TO SUSPEND OFFSHORE DRILLING. The Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company (OKIOC) plans to halt drilling of its well in the East Kashagan field for the winter once it taps oil, Interfax reported on 1 December. A spokesman for the consortium said that deposits are likely to have a high sulphur-dioxide content and that continued drilling could have "unpredictable consequences" in the event of a storm or a buildup of sea ice. On 29 November, Kazakhstan's Deputy Ecology Minister Marat Musataev told journalists in Almaty that some international oil companies engaged in western Kazakhstan neglect environmental safety regulations, RFE/RL's correspondent in the former capital reported. Drilling began at East Kashagan in August 1999. In September, OKIOC rejected Kazakh claims that it is violating safety and environmental regulations (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 23 September 1999). LF *********** RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC ___________________________________________________________ RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 3, No. 232, Part I, 1 December 1999 AZERBAIJAN OIL OFFICIAL RULES OUT NATO GUARD FOR PIPELINE. Ilham Aliev, Heidar's son and the vice president of the state oil company SOCAR, told Interfax on 30 November that the Azerbaijani leadership has not asked for NATO help in protecting the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil export pipeline against possible terrorist attacks. Aliev said Azerbaijan believes it has the resources to protect the pipeline on its own. He added that discussion of Azerbaijan's possible NATO membership is "an illusion," given the aspirations of former East bloc countries to join the alliance. LF U.S. COMPANY BEGINS EXTRACTING OIL IN GEORGIA. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze attended a ceremony at Dedoplistskaro in eastern Georgia on 30 November to mark the beginning of drilling of an oil well built by the U.S. company Frontera Resources, AP and Caucasus Press reported. The well is expected to yield some 150 tons of crude per day, which will be refined for domestic needs. LF *********** project Dagestan, Pipelines, and Russian Policy toward the South Caucasus: An Experiment in Cooperation Fails By Laurent Ruseckas Tensions in Dagestan have receded somewhat since last week, when overwhelming Russian force compelled a group of rebels led by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev to withdraw from villages they had occupied in southwestern Dagestan. The new government of Vladimir Putin has portrayed the episode as a decisive victory for Moscow over Islamic separatism, and this is true to a certain extent. Dagestan will not be joining Chechnya in de-facto independence for the time being. But the cross-border incursion-and the enormous military effort that was as required to counter it-have served again to emphasize Moscow's weakness in the southern reaches of the Russian Federation. The events in Dagestan also represent the failure of the constructive side of Russian policy toward the states of the South Caucasus-an approach that had been built on the transportation of oil. From late 1997 through early 1999, exports of Azerbaijani oil through Russia had introduced some shared interests and a basis for cooperation into what had been a hostile relationship. However, a year of mounting instability in Chechnya and Dagestan, and the prospect of more to come, have cut off these exports indefinitely, and made it very unlikely that Russia will reemerge as a transit country for significant volumes of Azerbaijani oil. An important source of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus has disappeared. The aftershocks of Russia's most dubious venture in the region-the 1994 invasion of Chechnya-are thus continuing to haunt the entire Caucasus, north and south, and complicate its chances for political stability. Much attention has been focused on the destructive side of Russian policy in the South Caucasus as Moscow has sought haphazardly to rebuild its declining position in the region. Evidence suggests that, since 1991, Russian elements have directly or indirectly sought to undermine domestic stability in both Azerbaijan and Georgia on a number of occasions. A series of incidents-the fall of the Azerbaijani government in 1993, support for separatism in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, two serious attempts on the life of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze-put a clearly destructive face on Russian policy toward the South Caucasus. Between 1995 and 1998, however, the character of Russian policy in the region was altered by the increasing importance of oil and pipeline politics. In pipeline politics, as in traditional politics, Moscow's basic goal was to strengthen Russian influence, and pipelines were seen as a means toward this end. Russian policymakers quickly grasped that they went into the pipeline derby with a fundamental advantage-the existing pipeline linking Baku to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. For the AIOC consortium of international companies that operates Azerbaijan's flagship oil project, the prospect of using this Russian pipeline for exports of "early oil" was commercially attractive. The pipeline gave Russia a source of positive leverage over Azerbaijan-a carrot rather than a stick-which was potentially far more effective than the destructive tactics on which it had previously relied. For the government of Azerbaijan, as well as the oil companies, the commercial attractiveness of the Russian pipeline route was balanced by a desire to avoid excessive dependence on Russia. Therefore Baku and AIOC decided in 1995 to seek to use the Russian pipeline for initial exports while also beginning construction on a new Georgian pipeline. From Moscow's point of view, this outcome represented only a partial success. Nevertheless, it did set the stage for the first 18 months of AIOC oil exports to transit Russian territory exclusively. More significantly, the pipeline decision created the basis for a thaw in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. The negotiations held in 1995 and early 1996 regarding the commercial terms for Azerbaijan's use of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline showed Russian policy at its most constructive. The Russian pipeline authority Transneft-already infamous as a major source of headaches for foreign investors in the Russian oil sector-seemed to be have been instructed to sign a transportation deal without delay. Commercial and legal terms were agreed upon rather rapidly (by Russian standards), and Azerbaijan and AIOC found themselves with a solid long-term contract to ship volumes of early oil through the Russian pipeline. Until early this year, the presence of Chechnya astride the pipeline route seemed like an insurmountable problem that had nonetheless been surmounted. After a period of stalemate in 1997, the Russian authorities reached an agreement with the Chechen government of Aslan Maskhadov that allowed oil to flow, with Chechnya receiving a significant share of the tariff revenue. The operation of the pipeline was far from smooth, but by and large it was a success. For the second half of 1998 Azerbaijani pipeline exports to Novorossiysk averaged 80,000 barrels per day, generating revenues and the beginnings of trust. This year has seen matters take a severe turn for the worse. Beginning in February, the pipeline began to be interrupted for extended periods of time; by July no oil was flowing whatsover. There appear to have been two causes: first, the steady deterioration of relations between Moscow and Groznyi, and second, the complete inability of President Maskhadov to exert control over Chechnya's so-called "field commanders," of which Shamil Basayev is the most prominent example. It is also precisely these two factors that gave rise to the incursion into Dagestan. Maskhadov's government cannot prevent independent Chechen groups from disrupting the pipeline, nor from taking aggressive steps to destabilize Dagestan. At the same time, Russian actions have helped create a new consensus in Chechnya that Maskhadov's cooperative approach on the pipeline issue has yielded little or nothing in way of reciprocation from Moscow. Thus cooperation has been replaced by a more militant approach, which comes more naturally to Chechen leaders in the wake of a bloody war and the poverty and social dysfunction of its aftermath. For Azerbaijan and its oil ambitions, the shutoff of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline-which would have been devastating in 1997 or 1998-is of less consequence today. The pipeline to the Georgian port of Supsa which was inaugurated at the beginning of 1999 can accommodate current AIOC production, and its lower tarrifs (a function of the fact that the project shareholders financed and built the pipeline) make it more profitable than the Russian route. As the next phase of offshore development moves forward, Azerbaijan will need new export capacity. The closure of the Russian pipeline reduces flexibility and increases the urgency of moving forward with a large, new pipeline, but building a so-called main export pipeline to Turkey (the proposed Baku-Ceyhan line) would likely have been a top Azerbaijani priority in any case. Now that instability in Chechnya and Dagestan has denied Russia a piece of the pipeline action, the geopolitical context of Azerbaijani oil development will be much more contentious. The effects are already being felt in Russia's relations with Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia and Armenia. Unconstrained by pipeline dependence, Azerbaijan has taken a much more aggressive anti-Russian policy line and signaled its desire to strengthen its relations with the United States and NATO. Russia has reacted predictably by moving back toward a more hostile stance toward Azerbaijan. The Georgian pipeline now appears to Moscow less as a commercial competitor than as a political affront, and perhaps as a result Russian pressure on Georgia-particularly through meddling in Georgia's internal politics-has been increasing. In this broader context, the strong military and political partnership between Russia and Armenia appears especially important for Russian policy, and difficult for Armenia's leadership to resist. A constructive Russian attitude toward the Karabakh peace negotiations seems less likely than it did before. Cross-border pipelines do not necessarily breed peace. But the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline had the potential to help mitigate the deep tensions that have characterized the politics of the post-Soviet Transcaucasus region. Its continuing operation would have taken some of the politics out of the pipeline issue, and encouraged all players to be more cooperative in Azerbaijani oil development. A Russian stake in the pipeline game would have softened the edges as Azerbaijan moved toward its ultimate goal of exporting the bulk of its future oil production through Georgia and Turkey. By cutting off the Russian pipeline, the situation in Chechnya and Dagestan has made it all but certain that Russia, and indeed all of the relevant states, will view pipelines as weapons in a zero-sum game that pits Russian interests against those arrayed in support of Baku-Ceyhan and the geopolitical alignment that it represents. Mr. Ruseckas is a Ph.D. candidate and Javits fellow in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. The focuses of his study are international relations and political economy, with special emphasis on the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ruseckas is also a consultant at Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), a global consulting firm headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Ruseckas has worked with CERA since 1991, advising international energy companies on political risk and the investment environment in the Caspian region. ********* TURKISTAN-ECONOMY-BULLETIN.. Volume 99:150-06-December-1999 Editors: Charlie Bartholomew, Mehmet Tutuncu This issue distributes to 2829 subscribers in 65 countries Ukraine Ukraine accelerates construction of the Eurasian oil transport corridor 24 November, Azer-press KIEV, - The government of Ukraine obliged its economy ministry to work out the options of instituting the favorable investment regime for the construction of the Eurasian oil transport corridor by 15 December. Vice-premier Anatoly Kinah told the press that the diversification of energy supplies to Ukraine was the matter of national security. According to Mr. Kinah, the problem shall be solved following the completion of the Yuzhny oil terminal and of Odessa-Brodi oil pipeline. Saying that the agreement on MEP Baku-Ceyhan was 'a very serious political solution', Mr. Kinah added that Ukraine had to commission the terminal near Odessa and Odessa-Brodi pipeline in 2000 so as to make use of the resources of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. It should be remembered that Ukraine's Gosneftegazprom submitted for consideration of the investors the concept of developing the trans-Ukraine route, and Azer-press is informed that SOCAR and several AIOC shareholders (including BPAmoco) are being fairly loyal to this project. Appearance of this transport corridor would make it possible to supply Caspian oil to the refineries in Ukraine as well as to Slovakia, Czechia and even to Austria by using the vacant capacities of the Druzhba main going by Brodi (has been used by 60-70 pc in the past several years). Further extension of the pipeline to Adamova Zastava (300 km) would make it possible to ship oil to Poland and Germany by using the vacant capacities of Druzhba-2 main. In addition, Caspian oil could pass along the Ukrainian corridor to the northwest Europe that has until now been traditionally oriented to the low-sulphur oil from the fields in the North Sea. In this connection, it is possible to extend the transport corridor Baku-Supsa-the Yuzhny -Adamova Zastava to the Baltic ports of Gdansk, Rostock and Ventspils. If the reverse pipeline Loyna-Willhelmshafen (Germany) is ever built, Azeri oil can be piped to all refineries along the existing pipeline networks of Europe, and without any extra re-shipping by tankers in the North and Baltic Sea ports. Azer-press reference: Kiev has invested approximately $150 mn in this project so far. By the preliminary plans, 466 km of Odessa-Brodi pipeline must be completed by the end of this year (the total length of 667 km). The initial commissioning of the Yuzhny terminal and of this pipeline is set for 2001. At first, the terminal will have the annual transit capacity of 9 mn tons, and the pipeline's capacity will be 14 mn t/yr. In the future, however, the route will be able to handle as much as 40-mn t/yr. The total cost of the project is calculated to equal $450 mn. ********* RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC ___________________________________________________________ RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 3, No. 237, Part I, 8 December 1999 GEORGIA WANTS PIPELINE AGREEMENT AMENDED. Less than three weeks after the signing in Istanbul of legal agreements on the operation of the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil export pipeline, Georgian International Oil Company President Giorgi Chanturia told journalists in Tbilisi on 7 December that Georgia wants those agreements revised, Caucasus Press reported. Chanturia said that Georgia wants changes introduced in the sections of those agreements dealing with the ecological safety of the pipeline and the distribution of responsibility for its operation between the companies using the pipeline and the states across whose territory it runs. He said Georgia specifically considers "unacceptable" an article under which Georgia would bear sole financial responsibility for ecological damage caused by a rupture of the pipeline on its territory. LF ********** INFORMATION BULLETIN News and Information on Third Sector Development in Azerbaijan NOVEMBER 1999 No 21 Children and the Caspian The British-American company BP/Amoco has produced a wonderful present to Azerbaijani schoolchildren. The company published colorful books entitled the Wonderful World of the Caspian and Ecological Atlas, as well as colored posters. The presentation of this material took place at a ceremony at BakuТs ecological lyceum, well known for its traditions and achievements in ecological education of children. It was very pleasant to find oneself in a decorated hall with adults and children talking heatedly about the ecology of the Caspian. Attending the meeting were scientists - professors Abdul Kasymov and Rafik Kasumov. They stressed the unique nature of the Caspian and touched upon its flora and fauna. The audience listened intently to the representatives of BPТs environmental protection department Faik Askerov and Yuliy Zaytsev who discussed industrial development of the Caspian and nature-protection activity of their company. Yuliy Zaytsev assured the audience that in 2000 the department is planning to publish the book in Azeri as well as issue new interesting books. The audience Тs questions were far from purely childrenТs ones and touched upon the importance of ecological stability and monitoring of the sea, sources of financing of ecological projects, etc. The children voiced their readiness to take part in ecological monitoring with the company. In addition, representatives from the following NGOs attended the ceremony: Green Movement of Azerbaijan, Children Ecological Organization Azerbaijan in the 21 Century, and the Youth Ecological Movement. Those present underscored NGOТs role, especially children organizations, in resolving many of societyТs problems. Thus, the manager of BP/Amoco ecological department, Faik Askerov, called upon the children to be actively involved in the environmental movement, develop projects and raise their voice in support of nature. The representative of the company see NGOs as an effective force to lead all strata of the population into more active involvement in public life including collaboration with BP/Amoco and other companies. The NGO sector and the public should thank the oil company for its noble action toward the welfare of our children. Irada Guliyeva Azerbaijan in the 21st Century ********* RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC ___________________________________________________________ RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 3, No. 236, Part I, 7 December 1999 GOVERNMENT SLAPS HIGHER DUTY ON OIL. Prime Minister Putin signed a resolution on 6 December increasing the export duty on crude oil to 15 euros ($15.27) per metric ton. The tariff was previously 7.5 euros. The government had been considering raising the duty to 12.5 euros but changed its policy only recently, "Vremya MN" reported on 7 December. As a result, the government is expected to earn an extra 1.8 billion rubles per month beginning next year, according to the daily. Unidentified sources in the White House told the newspaper that the government needs more resources to spend on defense and elections. Also mentioned was the need to find new monies since IMF funds have not been forthcoming. Last month, Putin declared that Russia could not continue to rely on revenues from oil and gas and should make development of the country's military-industrial complex a priority. JAC *********** EXPORT OF AZERBAIJANI OIL VIA GEORGIA RESUMES. Pumping of oil through the Baku-Supsa export pipeline resumed on 4 December, Caucasus Press reported, quoting Georgian oil official Irakli Kelbakhiani. But according to ITAR-TASS on 6 December, pumping has not yet reached full capacity. Last month, pumping was suspended after torrential rains in western Georgia washed away the ground from under a 50 meter section of the pipeline. On 3 December in Tbilisi, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze met with David Woodward, president of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, to discuss the ecological safety of the pipeline. LF ******** KAZAKHSTAN, CHEVRON FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON TENGIZCHEVROIL SALE. Nazarbaev held talks in Almaty on 3 December with Richard Matzke, president of Chevron Overseas, but the two men failed to agree on terms for the sale of part of Kazakhstan's 25 percent stake in the joint venture to develop the Tengiz oil field, Interfax reported. Chevron is the senior partner in that consortium, with a 45 percent stake. The proposed sale has generated serious disagreements within the Kazakh leadership. LF ******** #7 Inter Press Service Conflict-Caucasus: Petrodollars Behind the Chechen Tragedy MOSCOW, (Dec. 7) IPS - As the Russian army tightens its grip around the Chechen capital of Grozny and Moscow becomes increasingly assertive, analysts stress that manoeuvring over huge oil-transit deals is the real issue of the Chechen war. Today, Russian Primer Minister Vladimir Putin rejected politely, but in unequivocal terms, the Western criticism for Russia's ultimatum yesterday to Grozny's civilians -- to leave the city before Dec. 11, or die under artillery and air fire. Human rights activists argue that thousands of elderly and ill civilians trapped in Grozny face death in the coming days. The Russian military dismiss the allegation, arguing that most of those left in the city are Muslim rebels, using civilians as a human shield. It has been often said that disputes over oil transit are behind the tragedy in unruly Chechnya -- seen as the biggest security threat in the region. Russia has been keen to use its Baku-Novorossiisk export route for Azerbaijani "early" oil exports. But the pipe crosses over 153 kilometers of Chechen territory, which makes it unreliable as long as the country is lawless. "Early" oil is the first crude to be exported from three Azerbaijani offshore fields being developed under a multi-billion-dollar project. Larger quantities are expected to flow early next century from the Caspian basin, considered to be one of the world's most important new sources of fossil fuels. At first the Russians tried to negotiate with the rebellious Chechens' leaders. After a hard bargaining process, on September 9 1997 Russian and Chechen officials signed an agreement to allow the Azerbaijani oil travel through the separatist republic. Under this agreement, Transneft, the Russian operator, agreed to pay a 43-cent fee per ton of oil, down from the $2.2 initially demanded by the Chechens. Russia also agreed to take care of maintenance and security, but the flow was soon halted after armed gangs began stealing large amounts of oil. Then the Russians decided to build an alternative pipeline in Dagestan -- to bypass the Chechen section. But inroads by Chechen militants into Dagestan last August showed that this option was unsafe too. It was then that the second Chechen war commenced. In addition, it is feared that terrorist threats may hold up the construction of a 1,600-kilometer link between the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan and a Black Sea port near Novorossiisk, known as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The consortium -- established back in 1992 by the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman -- is Russia's main hope to become the main agent in moving Caspian oil, said Vladimir Stanev, Russia's deputy Fuel and Energy minister. In December 1996, 50 percent of CPC's shares were sold to international oil corporations, effectively turning the consortium into the largest privately-financed oil infrastructure project in the former Soviet states. The project, worth $2.5 billion, is expected to be completed by June 30, 2001, CPC's director general Viktor Fedotov told IPS. The 750-kilometer Russian section of the pipeline is expected to be finished by the end of December 2000 with the first tanker scheduled to leave in June next year. The consortium plans to start pumping half-a-million barrels per day by October 2001. Shareholders have invested some $700 million during 1999, and they plan to raise the figure up to $1.3 billion in 2000, Vagit Alekperov, head of Russia's LUKoil said. Some 60 percent of the investment comes from the two largest private shareholders -- LUKoil and Chevron, he said. On Dec. 2, Prime Minister Putin met with Fedotov, Alekperov and Chevron's president of international operations Richard Matzke, promising the government's support to the project. Putin, nominated by the ailing President Boris Yeltsin as his chosen successor, is also widely seen as the mastermind of the military campaign in Chechnya. The CPC will be a great success, Matzke announced. "My general attitude is of complete satisfaction with it. CPC will bring wealth to all participants," he told IPS. "After meeting with Putin we are sure that we are going to honor our commitments, " Alekperov commented. "We have a variety of exploration projects in the Caspian and our oil will also go through this CPC pipeline," he said. LUKoil, which has drilled its first offshore well in the north Caspian Sea, holds a 12.5 percent stake in the consortium. The pipeline will transport oil from the Tengiz and possibly also from the Karachaganak oil fields, where LUKoil has 5 and 15 percent stakes respectively. The CPC pipeline -- expected to have an initial capacity of 28.2 million tons of oil a-year and a maximum of 67 million -- is presumed to be the Russian response to the Baku-Ceyhan oil-pipeline project signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan at the OSCE summit in Istanbul last month, at a ceremony attended by President Bill Clinton. This new link -- heavily supported by the US -- would leave Russia virtually out of the business of transporting Azerbaijani oil from the Azeri, Chirag and Gyuneshli offshore fields. The Russian government expects revenues of some $23.3 billion from the project within the next 40 years, while Kazakhstan plans to earn $8.2 billion. However, now the planned revenues look far from certain as the trans-Georgia pipeline and a new terminal at Supsa on the Black Sea are ready for oil exports. "We advocate a diversity of oil transit projects," Alekperov said. However, given the size of proven Caspian reserves -- "the CPC and Georgian routes will definitely be enough to transit Caspian oil within the next 10-15 years," he said, implying that Ceyhan pipeline is not economically viable. Some Russian analysts argue that Turkey and the US are supporting the Ceyhan project so as to elbow Russia off the Caspian. Furthermore, Ankara's quiet support to the Chechen militants has been said to be designed to sustain volatility in the northern Caucasus -- which would make it impossible for the competing CPC project to proceed. There have also been fears that in case of a Russian military success in Chechnya, Turkey could simply close the Bosporus and Dardanelles for Russian oil transit, using environmental concerns over possible spills as an excuse. "I do not think Turkey could go that far to block -- in clear violation of international treaties -- oil shipments from the Black Sea in favor of its pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Stanev, the Russian deputy minister said. Whoever is right -- manoeuvring over crude transit and big oil dollars are likely to remain a factor in an ongoing Chechen tragedy. |